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Rhetorical frames are used to support political agendas, define problems, diagnose 
causes, make policy judgments, and suggest solutions. Following the attacks on 
September 11, 2001, politicians and media pundits used Islamophobia as a fear-
mongering tactic to justify public policy formation. The purpose of this study was to 
analyze public discourse on Islamic terrorism in arguments advocating government 
surveillance, restrictive immigration policies, and other erosions of U.S. constitutional 
protections of its citizens. This study drew on the postmodern theories of Lakoff, 
Lyotard, and Said to critically examine U.S. political discourse on Islam and terrorism. 
Three conceptual rhetorical frames were examined:  Clash of Civilizations, Endangered 
Constitutional Protections, and Islamophobia. The key research question asked how U.S. 
politicians and high-profile national news commentators used biased rhetoric to frame 
discussions of Islam and terrorism. This qualitative study used content analysis of 44 
news reports of crimes that framed these incidents as Islam-inspired terrorism. Study 
findings suggested that defenders of the USA PATRIOT Act used a Clash of 
Civilizations frame that pitted Western freedom proponents against radical Muslim 
fanatics in struggles for social change. U.S. policy makers and news commentators 
described Islamic inspired terrorism as anti-American vengeance, Jihadism, and/or anti-
Semitism to control national debates and information flow. Implications of these findings 
suggest that an alternative Islamophobic framing can be deployed to make biases explicit, 
quell anxieties of and about stigmatized groups, raise the self-esteem of the vilified 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
This dissertation is about how news agencies and political leaders in the United 
States framed their communications and used the media to build support for specific 
public policy agendas following the events of September 11, 2001. In Chapter 1, I 
address the theoretical framework and the significance of the dissertation. I portray U.S. 
policymaking as a political process that is affected by various social and economic 
factors and how the media systems play an integral role in shaping the social context in 
which policies are developed. Through the media, the public is educated on government 
policies that affect their daily lives; from the government’s perspective, the policymakers 
gain informative insights on public opinion in reference to their programs and policies. 
Mass media acts as an intermediary between those who have an interest in influencing 
policies, such as interest groups, corporations, or political think tanks, and those members 
of the policymaking process that control the nature and scope of the political 
conversation and flow of information to the public. 
Background 
In this study, I provide an analysis of discourses surrounding the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001 (or Patriot Act). USA PATRIOT is a backronym—an acronym 
designed to spell out an already existing phrase—that stands for “Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct The Terrorism Act of 2001.” In the following analysis, I focus on two framing 
schemata used in discussions of the Patriot Act when it was up for reauthorization in the 
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U.S. Congress in 2011. For the purpose of this dissertation, the first frame is termed the 
Clash of Civilizations frame and the second is the Endangered Constitutional Protections 
frame. In Chapter 2, I present a review the literature associated with the policymaking 
process in terms of balancing national security and individual liberty. Specifically, I 
organized this study to examine how the media communications of the members of the 
U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate framed the reauthorization of the Patriot 
Act in 2011 along with the crafting of anti-Islam legislation in response to the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, also known as 9/11. 
In Chapter 3, I provide a description of the methodological approach that I used in 
this dissertation to analyze discourses. I used the content analysis method to reveal 
underlying themes or frames used to structure political discourses. The analysis 
contrasted the ways policymakers framed their discourses in support of and in opposition 
to post-9/11 legislation. Content analysis revealed how these discourses perpetuated 
Islamophobia, on the one side, or alerted citizens to the loss of constitutional protections 
on the other, and how both sides claimed to use the political process to protect the life 
and liberty of all U.S. citizens. In my content analysis, I did not simply rely on word 
count but rather focused on the conclusions regarding the deep structure of the 
arguments. Furthermore, I drew inferences from the words and statements annunciated by 
members of the policymaking community.  
 In this study, I also provide an analysis of the degree to which policymakers relied 
upon religious and cultural stereotyping by soliciting the media to engage in spreading 
anti-Islamic propaganda. President George W. Bush may have revealed more than his 
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handlers bargained for in directly addressing the use of media to garner support for the 
War on Terror when he said, “See, in my line of work you’ve got to keep repeating things 
over and over and over again for the truth to sink in, to kind of catapult the propaganda” 
(Froomkin, 2005, para. 6). 
Problem Statement 
The problem that I addressed in this study was fear mongering around Muslims 
and Islam in contemporary U.S. political discourse. Specifically, I focused on 
inflammatory language and exaggeration concerning an Islamic threat to expand 
government surveillance and intrusion into personal lives in the name of protecting U.S. 
citizens from terrorism. Few, if any, issues have been as salient a feature of concern to 
the United States in the post-9/11 period as terrorism. For example, according to a 2010 
national poll, 79% of Americans ranked terrorism either as a serious or extremely serious 
threat to the nation; only the federal debt ranked as high (Gallup, 2010). The high ranking 
of terrorism as a concern to the U.S. people has been a consistent feature since the 9/11 
attacks (Gallup, 2010). Polls further revealed that a significant segment of the U.S. 
population equated Muslim-Americans with support for Islamic terrorism. A 2011 CBS 
News/New York Times poll showed that one in three Americans believe that Muslim-
Americans are sympathetic to Islamic terrorists (CBS, 2011). This statistic was despite 
the fact that 92% of Muslim-Americans said that they were not sympathetic to terrorists 




Islamophobia in broad context has been defined as a form of racism and an 
unfounded fear of Islam, Muslim, and Arabs (Taras, 2013). Islamophobic attitudes in 
Western nations are pervasive in mass media and political life (Heibling, 2013). The 
United States witnessed an increase in anti-Islamic prejudice in the decade following 
9/11, as was demonstrated in the surfeit of special laws and policies adopted to prevent 
terrorist acts perpetrated by Muslim extremists (Smith, 2013). This trend was evident in 
the aftermath of 9/11; staff reporters and people interviewed on television began to 
stereotype Muslims on the basis of imputed religious beliefs rather than bodily or 
physical characteristics (Taras, 2013). Islamophobia is a by-product of willful political 
rhetoric; thus, these attacks go right to the heart of two critically important national issues 
of our democracy and U.S. national security (Tamdgidi, 2012). The U.S. Constitution 
upholds freedom of religion for all Americans. Contending that some religions are not 
part of the promise of American freedoms established by the nation’s founders directly 
challenges who the American people are as a nation (Meer & Modood, 2015). 
Political framing and the use of media to spread Islamophobic rhetoric informed 
the methodology that I deployed in this study, in which I aimed to address the root causes 
of anti-Islamic bias. Domestically, this cause is similar to the American Civil Rights 
Movement of the 1960s, as African Americans fought racial discrimination to access the 
liberties guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Islamophobia, like the Jim Crow laws that 
mandated racial segregation between African Americans and white Americans in the 
Southern United States from 1890 to 1965, threatens to create a subclass of citizens in the 
United States. This dissection of society has the potential to disrupt the domestic and 
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international influence of the United States as a democratic nation built on freedom of 
religion and equality for all. 
Purpose of the Study 
The problem that I addressed in this study was scare-mongering in U.S. political 
discourse around the threat of Islamic terrorism to justify expansion of the security state 
and erosion of citizens’ constitutional rights. My focus in this research was on public 
statements of politicians and pundits that have been reported in the national news media. 
The research paradigm to be deployed is framing analysis—an examination of language 
used by the proponent of a certain position to set the context in which a choice is to be 
made (Goffman, 1975; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). My purpose in this study was to 
analyze public discourse surrounding Islamic terrorism in terms of frames that have been 
used to argue for enhanced government surveillance, restrictive immigration policies, and 
other erosions of U.S. citizens’ constitutional protections. My overarching purpose of this 
study was to explore how policymakers frame their arguments to garner broad public 
support for a particular political agenda. 
Research Questions 
In this dissertation, I present a frame analysis of contemporary U.S. political 
discourse on several themes related to Islam, terrorism, and constitutional freedoms. I 
explored political discourses to address the following questions: 
           Q1. How do U.S. politicians and high-profile news commentators in the national 




            Q2. How does the use of such frames constitute a kind of Islamophobia? 
            Q3. How do these frames influence public opinion, spreading fear and suspicion 
of Muslims? And more specifically, how are such frames used to garner popular support 
for extreme, invasive measures by the security state? 
            Q4. How do new security measures that were instituted in the Islamophobic 
political climates represent a loss of traditional freedoms, such as rights to privacy and 
equal protection under the law for all citizens, regardless of ethnic or religious identity? 
Theoretical Conceptual Framework for the Study 
Theoretical Foundation 
The characterization of conflicts between Islamic and Western nations as a Clash 
of Civilizations is one that was espoused by Huntington (1993, p. 12) as the world of 
geopolitics experienced a shift from the Cold War mentality leaving a vacuum of 
uncertainty in reference to allegiance and kinship. Huntington’s model may be placed in 
the evolving history of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. democratic profile, in terms of 
international relations, has been predicated by a singular ideology, meaning that the 
nation has adopted a singular political agenda and executed that agenda in all aspects of 
its interactions. From the presidency of James Monroe to the current administration of 
Donald Trump, each administration offered a singular vision or doctrine that has 
dominated the spectrum of the United States’ relationship with foreign nations and the 
notion of domestic and international relations (Meiertöns, 2010). The Monroe Doctrine 
declared European states should not interfere with the affairs of sovereign nations in the 
Americas, the Kennedy Doctrine was concerned with the containment and defeat of 
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communism, and the events of 9/11 ushered in the war on terrorism and the Bush 
Doctrine of preemptive strikes against potential threats (Jervis, 2003).  The latter finds its 
principles in the notion of an inevitable Clash of Civilizations that warrants the domestic 
and foreign actions of the United States. 
Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations model (1993) endeavored to offer a new 
paradigm of world politics. Hence, the model was primarily a theory of international 
relations. Huntington primarily focused on cultural-religious-civilization factors in 
contrast to state-centric realist theory and system-dominated neorealist model. He called 
forth a paradigmatic shift to understand the post-Cold War global politics  arguing that 
his “civilizational conflict paradigm” was superior to the alternative models that had been 
developed after the Cold War. Since intercivilizational issues were replacing 
intersuperpower ones in the new era, his paradigm provided a better model for 
international relations than any alternative (Huntington, 1993, pp. 187-189). 
Huntington (1993) predicted that civilizational differences that stem from 
divergent cultural and religious values would be primary causes of regional and global 
conflicts in the post-Cold War epoch. The Clash of Civilizations was to be inevitable 
although not necessarily violent. The fault lines between civilizations stemmed from 
differences in social and political values. Core values that differentiated civilizations 
(Western, Confucian, Islamic, etc.), according to Huntington (1996) included 
irreconcilable beliefs on the proper relations between genders, parents, and children; 
individuals and the state; and God and man.  Huntington differentiated between seven or 
eight major civilizations, foreseeing likely conflicts between Islamic and Western 
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civilizations because Islam was the only civilization that aspired to universal values that 
posed a significant challenge to the West (Huntington, 1996). On the other hand, 
Huntington (1996) also discussed an Islamic-Confucian connection against Western 
civilization. To counter this possible threat to Western hegemony, he recommended that 
the West should limit expansion of military and economic power of the Islamic-
Confucian states, and the West should exploit differences between the two civilizations.  
Around the time, Huntington was developing his Clash of Civilizations model, 
Fukuyama (1989) produced an alternate hypothesis coined “The End of History.” In this 
model, Fukuyama reasoned that instead of a division of civilizations there would be 
unification. Fukuyama argued that the end of the Cold War marked a major turning point 
in the ideological evolution of humankind, and that with the fall of the Soviet Union, 
Western liberal democracy as the only competing superpower would emerge as the final 
form of human government in all regions of the world (Fukuyama, 1989). Here 
Fukuyama was postulating that democracy would become more globally prevalent based 
upon his assertion that democracy since the French Revolution has proven itself to be a 
better and more effective system. After the events of 9/11, the notion of a Clash of 
Civilizations rose to prominence in U.S. national discourse on questions of national 
security. But where did individual liberty lie in respect to this ideology? 
Conceptual Framework 
The main conceptual framework for this study was frame analysis of statements 
made by U.S. politicians, reporters, and news commentators drawn from the national 
media. Frame analysis has been used as a method for examining and critiquing the 
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language that politicians and public policy advocates use to persuade the public and 
promote their political agendas (Lakoff, 2004; Lakoff & Ferguson, 2007). Framing is a 
rhetorical strategy by which a speaker sets the terms of debate to force opponents into a 
corner or to make certain conclusions seem reasonable or unreasonable under the terms 
of the frame. Frames construct a point of view that predisposes a listener to interpret a 
given situation in such a way as to push them toward a particular conclusion. Frames are 
also used to define problems, diagnose causes, make policy judgments, and suggest 
solutions (Kuypers, 2006).  
Frame analysis is particularly relevant to the study of political discourses that seek 
to scapegoat or blame minority groups for perceived problems a nation is facing (Kaya, 
2016). Specifically, in this study, I will show how the fear of Islamic terrorism has been 
used to expand the power of the surveillance state. 
Nature of the Study 
In the post-9/11 political environment, federal and state policymakers have 
shaped the public discourse based on a Clash of Civilizations paradigm. By singling out a 
group for special scrutiny based on religious affiliation, policymakers have violated their 
promise to uphold the U.S. Constitution. This is what Islamophobic frames have 
accomplished. In their public pronouncements over reauthorization of the Patriot Act 
provisions, leading members of Congress including senators Orrin Hatch and Jon Kyl on 
the Republican side, and senators Dianne Feinstein and Chuck Schumer on the 
Democratic side,  deployed such frames. These frames represented formulations of two 
diametrically opposed perspectives: one focused on Islamic terrorist threats, and another 
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focused on concern over encroachment on civil liberties of the U.S. people, including 
Muslim-Americans.  
The problem that I examined in this study arose with regard to the reauthorization 
of the Patriot Act, media coverage, and the rhetoric associated with Islam and Arab 
heritage. In a nation built upon the ideas of equality, freedom of religion, and freedom of 
the press, there have been a limited number of studies that have explored the potential 
backlash of Islamophobia and the adoption of the clash of civilization paradigm as the 
sole legislative approach for 21st-century United States. I analyzed these topics to 
understand the various facets of Islamophobia and explore both how the relationship with 
civil liberties has been affected as well as how the media system could be used to 
optimize a status quo sentiment.  
Insufficient systematic analysis of how framing in political communications has 
been conducted was manifested in one of the most salient public policy issues before the 
American people during the past 10 years on an issue with constitutional implications. 
Furthermore, there has not been scholarly research aimed at discerning the degree to 
which arguments as framed during discourse over the Patriot Act reauthorization 
comported with objective facts. This is the problem this dissertation sought to address. It 
did so by using content analysis as a primary research methodology to examine the nature 
of the meanings inferred in congressional pronouncements surrounding the 2011 
reauthorization of the Patriot Act provisions. 
It appeared that politicians framed their arguments so as to satisfy their 
supporters, including their constituents, campaign contributors, political parties, and 
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lobbyists. In the context of a representative democracy, the question has remained as to 
what extent politicians frame particular issues to satisfy the demands of special interest 
groups over those of the voters. In the case of the Patriot Act, the power ought to have 
lain in the hands of the constituents or voters, and there was a clear division in public 
opinion as to the necessity of certain provisions of the act. The use of the media was 
strategic in that it accomplished several tasks, functioning both as a nexus of influence by 
providing a platform for voices to broadcast certain frames. 
 
Definitions 
Civil liberties. Provisions incorporated into the Bill of Rights of the U.S. 
Constitution that provide protections for the U.S. people and guarantee freedom of 
speech, freedom of religion, and protection against unreasonable search and seizure (U.S. 
Const. amendments. I, IV). 
Clash of civilizations frame. A view based in a post-Cold War theory of the 
international political order, in which the world is divided into seven or so civilizations; 
or large, geopolitical complexes united by core values based ultimately in religious 
traditions. A coalition of countries that make up Western civilization was destined to 
conflict on this model with groups or nations associated with Islamic civilization 
(Huntington, 1993). 
Endangered Constitutional Protections frame. A category of political 
discourse in which defenders of the U.S. Constitution fight to preserve core constitutional 
12 
 
rights such as freedom of speech and protection against unlawful search and seizure 
(Miller & Fox, 2007). 
Epiphenomenalism. A style of political discourse that favors highly charged 
words, signs and symbols, and self-referential statements over fact-based reporting, thus 
creating a socially constructed reality (Fox & Miller, 2007). 
Framing. These are mental structures, mediated by language, that structure the 
way that people see the world. In politics, frames are both deliberately and unconsciously 
deployed to shape social policies and advance political agendas (Lakoff, 2004). Frame 
analysis was used in this dissertation to reveal how political elites manipulated public 
opinion (Scheufele, 1999). 
Global war on terrorism. This was an international military campaign headed by 
the United States in response to the 9/11 attacks. The George W. Bush Administration 
used this term to make a case for a military response on foreign shores against 
organizations designated terrorist and regimes accused of supporting them. The campaign 
made a particular focus on Muslim countries said to harbor Islamic terrorist organizations 
(Wolfe, 2008). 
Hate crime. A hate crime is a violent criminal act that has been alternatively 
categorized as a bias motivated crime that targets a victim based on his or her actual or 
perceived membership in a social group (FBI, 2016). 
 Islamism. Islamism has been used by Western academics to distinguish political 
Islam from Islam as simply a variety of religious observance (Wright, 2015). A defining 
feature of political Islam is to reform government and society in accordance with 
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sharia—Islamic law—either peacefully from the ground up or through revolution or 
military invasion (Roy, 1994). 
Islamophobia. Islamophobia refers to policies and practices that discriminate 
against Muslims or people of Middle-eastern heritage, but also to the underlying bigotry 
of individuals who author or promote such policies (Love, 2009). 
 Islamophobia frame. A frame that emphasizes the persecution of Muslims as a 
vilified religious group, often, in the U.S. context, by portraying them as a threat to 
national security (Kumar, 2011). 
Jihadism. Jihadist is a term used by Western academics prior to 9/11, and 
increasingly since, to distinguish violent from nonviolent Sunni Islamists. In this study, I 
followed the academic convention and used the term when discussing violent extremists 
(Wright, 2015), although the term is rejected by many Muslims because it associates a 
spiritual concept jihad—a spiritual struggle within oneself—with violent extremism. 
Mass media. A complex of communication technologies used to reach mass 
audiences, including traditional broadcast media such as television, radio, and cinema, 
and newer electronic media such as Internet search engines, and blogs (Thompson, 1995) 
Patriot Act. An act of Congress, initially signed into law in 2001 and 
reauthorized in 2005 and 2011, designed to provide for national security against domestic 
terror attacks on U.S. soil through a range of provisions that include business records 
provisions, roving wiretap provisions and the “lone wolf” provisions as described in the 
text of this dissertation (USA PATRIOT Act of 2001). 
             Political elites. Within the U.S. political context, political elites are those “who 
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hold office, run for office, [have] access to the media . . . and frame political issues” 
(Wilson, Dilulio, & Bose, 2010, p. 168). Wilson et al. (2010) indicated that U.S. 
Congress was the site of ideological consistency among U.S. political elites. Therefore, in 
this dissertation, I narrowly focuses on the subset of U.S. political elites in the U.S. 
House of Representatives and U.S. Senate. 
Postmodernism. A characterization of the present historical condition, in which 
ideological assumptions of the previous modern period that began with the 
Enlightenment, including ideals of objectivity, scientific truth, and rationality, have been 
displaced by epiphenomenalism, language games, and discourses of power (Fox & 
Miller, 2007). 
Terrorism. This dissertation is concerned with the concept of terrorism as “the 
unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a 
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or 
social objectives,” following the definition in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations.  
(FBI, 1998, p. i). 
Assumptions 
In this dissertation, I assumed  a postmodernist perspective. Postmodernism is 
relativistic with regard to truth claims. In this view, language is capable of providing just 
partial pictures of the world to which it refers, every representation of the world is filtered 
through discourses of power, and no narrative can be taken at face value as neutral or 
objective (Best & Kellner, 1991). Postmodernists explore how language, power and 
history shape human views of reality, truth and knowledge, aiming to uncover multiple 
15 
 
realities, in contrast to the realism of postpositivists. 
            Postmodernist assumptions are appropriate in a study of the framing effects of 
political discourses because the subject matter is neither value neutral nor decidable in 
objective terms (Kangas, Niemelä, & Varjonen, 2014). Although frames may be factually 
false or include misinformation, the truth or falsity of a frame is not the essential aspect 
relevant to framing analysis. Frames are a use of language formulated, either consciously 
or unconsciously by the framer, to lead the listener to a particular conclusion or value 
judgment. The important aspect of frames is not their factual or not factual nature, rather 
their directive nature. My focus in this dissertation was how politically motivated frames 
have been deployed to sway audiences or create consensus on a course of political action. 
This focus accepted the postmodernist view of language as discourses of power. As this 
is an examination of words, not of numbers, the methodology will favor critical methods 
that are intrinsically qualitative (Hollinger, 1994, p.173). 
Scope and Delimitations 
Several limitations incumbent to this study included questions of accuracy, 
transferability, and framing effects. The problem that I addressed in this study was fear 
mongering about Muslims and Islam in contemporary U.S. political discourse since 9/11. 
I chose this focus as a prominent feature of U.S. political discourse at the start of the 21st 
century and have continued since then.  By analyzing the language used in political 
discussions of this topic, I have revealed the regarding the deliberate use of fear tactics 
and exaggeration have been deployed to expand government surveillance and intrusion 
into personal lives in the name of protecting U.S. citizens from terrorism. I chose my 
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specific focus because it potentially can have dire consequences for the lives of U.S. 
Muslims as a targeted group, as well as eroding constitutional protections for all U.S. 
citizens. Islamophobic discourse in other countries, and the geopolitical consequences of 
anti-Muslim rhetoric in relation to U.S. foreign policy are beyond the boundaries of this 
study. 
A risk in any content analysis is that the analysis is only as effective as data 
sources are reliable (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The data in this study included spoken 
words and written transcripts by prominent politicians and news commentators as 
collected from online media sources. My assumption was that these media sources 
accurately portrayed these pronouncements. However, the possibility exists that factors 
including internal media bias may result in these pronouncements not being accurately 
reported or being reported in a distorted manner. Should this be the case, coding in 
content analysis—one of the primary methods used in this study—could mitigate these 
out of context portrayals.  This situation being the challenge, the sources from which 
content is derived have been independently verified as those from which most Americans 
receive their news online and it is assumed that these sources portray at least the targeted 
pronouncements accurately. 
Limitations 
The data for this study consist of publicly available statements made by prominent 
U.S. politicians, news commentators, and news reporters at a national level from the time 
of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, to the completion of the writing of the 
dissertation in 2018.  Because the data are drawn from an immense number of alternative 
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statements over a large span of time, selection of which quotes to use and how they are 
relevant reflect the predetermined historical and geopolitical scope of the study. The 
study is therefore suggestive in nature and does not attempt to assert a final or definitive 
claim as to how widely the U.S. public in general holds Islamophobic prejudices. 
Although the quotes are accurate and appropriately documented, another researcher 
might select an alternative set of quotes to present a different view of cultural trends in 
the course of this period. The limitations of the generalizability of the findings of this 
study are inherent in any study of cultural trends and patterns at a national level, as 
culture is inherently contested and multivocal (Nash, Kerr-Koch, & Hackett, 2014). 
Significance of the Study 
The political apparatus in the United States has proven very adept at using the 
popular or mass media as a mechanism to voice their own unique platforms. Although the 
U.S. mass media includes dissenting voices that can provide a platform for debate, the 
constraints of acceptable dissent tend to be narrowly limited by implicit norms of 
acceptability (Herman & Chomsky, 2011). Among the many voices that constitute the 
American mass media, politicians use various broadcast platforms as a means to expand 
their ideas and influence. Meanwhile, the Word Wide Web (Web) has expanded the voice 
and influence of terrorist organizations abroad. The mass media—including news 
broadcasts, the press, and the Web—serve as tools to spread and market political ideas of 
corporate funded think tanks and government policymakers, just as this same media is 
used by commercial entities to sell products and compete for market share. 
             Specifically, I examined how media messages could affect the domestic and 
18 
 
international climate for the United States. I used a case analysis of the Patriot Act and 
how members of the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate framed media 
communications amid the development of domestic and international policies. The scope 
of the work evaluated press conferences, press releases, speeches, and correspondence.  
The social context of policymaking was shaped and developed by social and economic 
factors and by mass media—the assortment of information sources that reach large 
numbers of people, including TV, radio, newspapers, and the Internet. Through the 
media, citizens learn how government policies could affect them, and governments could 
also receive feedback on their policies and programs. The relationship between public 
opinion and framing can demonstrate how media matters when the message flow is one 
sided. 
             The prevalence of Islamophobia could be problematic because it could not only 
harm its Muslim targets but also threaten the wellbeing of U.S. society as a whole. An 
analysis of hate crime statistics suggests that Islamophobia can lead to an increase of 
physical attacks on individuals perceived to be Muslim, and on their property (Hate 
Crime Statistics, 2010). Islamophobia as a form of prejudice also could threaten to 
damage its targets’ “self-image, educational success, occupational attainment, mental 
health status and health status” (McKown, 2005, p. 177). A 2010 study confirmed some 
of these effects by revealing that perceived Islamophobia-motivation was associated with 
abuse and discrimination against those perceived to be Muslim and produced increased 
psychological distress and greater health risks in those targeted (McKown, 2010).  
            Islamophobia may also enable extremist groups such as the Taliban and al Qaeda 
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to recruit and carry out terrorist attacks. There are two reasons for this: (a) Islamophobia 
can result in the isolation and marginalization of its targets, which can leave them 
vulnerable and receptive to radicalization; and (b) Islamophobia can perpetuate the notion 
that the West is at war with Islam. Extremist Muslim groups could use the perception that 
the West is at war with Islam to recruit vulnerable Muslims to their ranks (Cilluffo, 2007, 
p. 116). 
             Since 9/11, Islamophobia has been manifested in a wide range of forms, 
including Islamophobic sentiments and opinions. In opinion polls of non-Muslim 
Americans, respondents have generally indicated that American and Islamic values are 
incompatible, and because of this, these respondents have also expressed their opinions 
that there is prejudice against Muslims and Islam. These Americans thought there existed 
general negative opinions of Islam, desires to limit Muslim Americans’ civil and legal 
rights, discomfort with Muslim Americans’ participation in the political process, and 
associations of violence, terrorism, untrustworthiness, extremism and fanaticism with 
Muslims and Islam (Nisbet, 2009). The statistics were recorded:  
            • Fifty eight percent of respondents in a 2006 ABC News/Washington Post poll 
associated violent extremism with Islam more than other religions (Nisbet, 2009). 
             • In a 2014 poll, Americans expressed the most prejudice toward Muslims 
relative to Christians, Jews and Buddhists (Pew Research Center, 2014). 
            The nation also witnessed a notable increase in Islamophobic sentiments, rhetoric, 
and incidents in 2010 (Khera, 2011). According to an ABC News/Washington Post poll, 
49% of Americans held “an unfavorable view of Islam” in 2010 compared to 39% in 
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2002 – a 10% increase in eight years (Wajat, 2011, p. 63). Similarly, polls from 2003 to 
2010 noted a rapid decline in favorable views on Islam among American non-Muslims of 
all political leanings (Khera, 2011). During 2010, the nation also experienced the 
“Ground Zero Mosque” controversy and became aware of Pastor Terry Jones’ plans to 
burn copies of the Qur’an (Khera, 2011). Finally, the FBI’s 2010 hate crime statistics 
revealed a 50% increase in anti-Islamic motivated hate crimes since 2009 (Hate Crimes 
on the Rise in 2011). This is particularly notable given that anti-Islamic motivated hate 
crimes have been consistently above pre-9/11 levels (Khera, 2011). 
            The mass media has played a significant role in promoting negative stereotypes of 
Muslims, Arabs, and Islam that generally fuel fears of terrorism (Public Opinion, 2009). 
Within the entertainment industry, over 200 post-9/11 movies have portrayed Arabs and 
Muslims in biased ways (Tutt, 2011). The majority of Arab and Muslim characters in 
television entertainment from 2001 to about 2006 were in some way connected to 
violence and featured in storylines connected to terrorism (Nisbet, 2009). Also, coverage 
of Islam was significantly negative within television news  (Coexist Foundation, 2009). 
Additionally, the negative tone of television coverage of statements about Islam between 
January and August 2009 were twice as frequent compared to statements about 
Christianity, according to Media Tenor (2017) - a research organization that monitors and 
analyzes media content for purposes of applied agenda setting (Tzortzis, Khalaf, & 
Salam, 2010). Media Tenor (http://us.mediatenor.com/en/) also found that two thirds of 
television coverage of Islam were negative during that same time period (Tzortzis, 
Khalaf, & Salam, 2010). Among television news sources, Fox News played a prominent 
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role in promoting Islamophobia (Saylor, 2014). 
            The Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) found a significant correlation 
between trust in Fox News and negative attitudes about Muslims. Americans who most 
trust Fox News were more likely to believe that Muslims wanted to establish Shari’a law, 
that Muslims have not done enough to oppose extremism, and that investigating Muslim 
extremism is a good idea. There are even differences among Republicans and white 
Evangelicals who trust Fox News most and those who trust other media (Public Religion 
Research Institute, 2011). In contrast to television, newspaper coverage of issues 
associated with Islam and terrorism has generally been found to present a more nuanced 
and fairer treatment compared to what is depicted on television, with the print media 
guilty of less stereotyping of Muslim Americans and increased knowledge and familiarity 
with Islam (Tzortzis, Khalaf, & Salam, 2010). Researchers have also found that people 
who received their news through television expressed more negative emotional reactions 
to terrorist attacks compared to those who received the news through newspapers 
(Tzortzis, Khalaf, & Salam, 2010). 
            The mass media in the United States constitutes a kind of filtration system that 
mediates communication between the public and their representatives in Congress. The 
media plays a fundamental role in the development of the social context in which policies 
are developed (Thompson, 2013). It is through mass media, such as television, the 
Internet, and the press, that citizens learn how government policies will affect them; and 
it is from these same sources that government officials gain feedback on their policies 
and programs. The media acts as the primary conduit between those who might want to 
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influence policy and the policymakers, meaning that the media is the apparatus used by 
players directly and indirectly involved in the policymaking process to control the 
manner in which political discourse is framed and disseminated (Candy, 2013). 
            There is a range of opinions on the reach of media influence, from those who 
believe the media has no bearing in policy making, to those who believe that the media 
by its very nature must exert a significant influence on the legislative process. A logical 
conclusion when considering these opposing views is that mass media has a degree of 
influence that is related to the issue at hand. Drawing such a conclusion, one ponders the 
question of which policy issues will be most and least affected by mass media coverage 
about constitutional parameters associated with civil liberties. In this study, I explored 
this key question by discussing the process for the reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT 
Act. 
            In a liberal democracy, mass media plays a crucial role as a litmus test for 
government affairs; to act as the filtration system to ensure that government can be held 
accountable to the people in which it draws its authority. It was found that the 
incorporation of mass media worldwide has been diminishing the ability of citizens to 
participate meaningfully in the policymaking process governing the media (Katz, & 
Halpern, 2013). This can be seen as many news stations and press channels that have 
been incorporated into large conglomerates have made programming and content 
decisions based upon ratings and corporate profits (Bagdikian, 2004; McChesney, 1999). 
Such corporate concerns present a contradiction in the democratic processes. Huge media 
corporations come to act in the capacity of a political player. The problem is observed 
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through the news corporations’ strong ties with business. Such ties can serve to 
compromise their ability to investigate the government in an unbiased manner.  
            The significance of political framing in the news media for this dissertation is 
three-fold: (a) the use of framing to direct public opinion to problems and solutions, (b) 
implications of such framing practices for American civil liberties, and (c) how the 
practice of framing is interpreted in recent Islamophobia studies. Politicians, activists, 
and news commentators commonly frame issues in political discourse in a way that sets 
up their audiences to focus on one set of problems and potential solutions (Druckman, 
2001). The manner in which an issue is framed not only biases how an event should be 
thought about, but also includes an implicit answer to the question of what, if anything, is 
to be done (Nelson & Kinder, 1996). Policymakers frame issues in order to manipulate 
public opinion and to gain support for their policy decisions. Deliberate political framing 
can constitute a process by which the media is manipulated and relied upon to shape mass 
opinion on important policy issues (Anderson, 2013). The preferred frame need not be 
supported by facts of comport with reality in framing a political message. Rather, framing 
may consist of cynical pronouncements that have little connection to accurate reporting 
of actual events (Schenck-Hamlin & Proctor, 2006). 
           Framing is not new to American political discourse. The policy process in a 
democratic society is designed to be fluid, and public policy is developed through 
argument and the contestation of discourses and ideas from multiple perspectives. This 
process becomes a matter of public discourse once policymakers engage the media 
whether via print, television or the Internet. The primary focus for policymakers 
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oftentimes plays an integral part in determining the policies and issues in which the 
media elects to focus.  
The media has received increased scholarly attention in recent years in light of its 
influence. Advances in media studies have closely paralleled the emergence of 
postmodern political theory, social constructivism, and the effects of hyper-reality upon 
political communications (Fox, 1996; Fox & Miller, 1995; Miller, 2002; Miller & Fox 
2007; Scott, 1997). Postmodern theory suggests that contemporary political discourse is 
based in symbolism and constitutes a kind of simulated politics (Fox & Miller, 1995). 
Miller and Fox (2007) described a kind of non-referential political language that they 
characterize as epiphenomenal. Words and symbols in this new reality, come to constitute 
alternate understandings of events, specific to a particular community of discourse. 
Reality as such is no longer grounded in conventional epistemological notions of 
objective fact. Instead, competing political discourses come to form socially constructed 
realities, or information bubbles that reinforce the beliefs of those subsumed in such 
bubbles. 
            Burnier (2005) has argued that if the Fox and Miller (1995) constructs are to have 
much impact on political theory, the incorporation of interpretive methods into 
investigative research will have to be important for analyzing how meanings are 
produced and disseminated. Hence, it is important to understand how political discourse 
over these issues are framed by policymakers and the media in examining important 
contemporary public policy issues before the American people within the postmodern 
context. The reauthorization of the Patriot Act in 2011 was a highly salient issue for the 
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American people and one in which evidence of framing by congressional leaders 
appeared to be evident as will be demonstrated below. It is important to understand how 
framing was manifest in the act’s reauthorization given the salience of the Patriot Act 
reauthorization and the central role of framing as a political phenomenon. My review of 
the literature does not point to any studies to date that have examined the Patriot Act 
reauthorization within the context of framing and the use of the media in the development 
of public opinion associated with the generalization of an ethno-religious population. A 
short investigation into this topic in Chapter 4 will fill that gap and set the stage for the 
second part of this study. 
            A second reason why the subject of this dissertation is significant stems from the 
nature of the U.S. Patriot Act and implications for national defense and American civil 
liberties. The responsibilities of Congress for both defending the American people and 
protecting their civil liberties are embodied in the Constitution. The Constitution states 
that the “United States shall guarantee to every state a republican form of government 
and shall protect each of them against invasion” (U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4). Article I, 
section 8 of the Constitution lists congressional powers that deal directly with the 
national defense including authority to declare war, raise and support armies, provide for 
a navy, and establish the rules for the operation of American military forces. The Bill of 
Rights provides the American people the constitutional protection of free speech in the 
Establishment Clause and against unreasonable search and seizure. 
            Members of Congress formed a fault line in a debate between national security 
and civil liberties as they deployed competing frames over reauthorization of the Patriot 
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Act in 2011.  Misleading rhetoric in the context of this political debate raised the issue of 
personal prejudice that posed an obstacle to the implementation of truly representative 
government. 
            The subject of framing within the context of the Patriot Act and constitutional 
provisions to protect both national security and civil liberties has received little attention 
in the scholarly literature to date. This dissertation is not about constitutional law. 
However, understanding how America’s policymakers sought to frame their arguments 
over the reauthorization of the Patriot Act could help to demonstrate the impact of 
framing upon constitutional issues at the heart of American political discourse. 
            A third point attesting to the importance of the subject of this dissertation lies in 
recent academic interest in Islamophobia. In this dissertation, the term Islamophobia has 
been defined as discriminatory policies and practices directed towards people of Muslim 
or Middle-Eastern heritage, suggesting racialized bigotry (Love, 2009). The historical 
period following the terror attacks of 9/11 has been accompanied by increasing scholarly 
interest in examining how Muslims are portrayed in the Western media. One sign of this 
lies in the launching of the Islamophobia.  Studies Journal at the Center for Race and 
Gender at the University of California at Berkeley. According to the center, the rationale 
for the new journal was derived from the understanding of Islamophobia as a political 
tool used to exploit fear and provide a rationale for expansion of the security state (Basin 
& Leung, 2015). 
             Recent research has been focused upon Islamophobic framing in the Western 
media including the United States (Frost, 2008; Gardner, Karakasoglus & Luchtenberg, 
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2009; Hoskins, Awan & O’Loughlin, 2011; Jackson, 2010; Saeed, 2007; Salim, 2010; 
Trevino, Kanso, & Nelson, 2010). Kumar (2012) summarized the general findings of this 
line of research in her book Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire, noting that 
portrayals of Muslims in the mainstream media have been largely negative since the 
events of 9/11. 
            Islamophobia also poses a significant threat to civil liberties.  The Stockholm 
International Forum on Combating Intolerance adopted a resolution equating 
Islamophobia with genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, and anti-Semitism in response to 
this threat (Stockholm Forum, 2001). The Texas State Board of Education in 2010 acted 
to curtail reference to Islam in school textbooks in a reactionary move against the 
perceived Muslim threat. The board justified its policy by indicating a need to prevent 
infiltration of Middle Eastern influence into national publishing, while critics of the act 
described this as fear mongering (New York Times, 2010). 
            In December 2011 home improvement chain Lowes cancelled its sponsorship of 
the cable TV reality show All-American Muslim after the Florida Family Association - a 
conservative advocacy group - criticized the content of the show for not accurately 
portraying average Muslims who, the group said, are extremists who want to impose 
shari’a law upon the U.S. (Freedman, 2011). Not only has this dissertation contributed to 
scholarly discourse over the subject of Islamophobia, it has also helped shed light on the 
degree to which congressional discourse might contribute to the Islamophobic 
phenomenon. 
            In summary, the significance of this dissertation lies in the timely articulating and 
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highlighting the role framing plays in public policy making and the saliency of the Patriot 
Act given current scholarly interests in the phenomenon of Islamophobia and the gaps 
this dissertation helped to fill in the literature. This dissertation reconciled the 
constitutional aspects associated with civil liberties in an intelligible perspective to the 
public without reproducing the provocative and sensationalistic framework popularized 
by Islamophobic rhetoric by providing an analysis of the complexity of the relationship 
between mass media and policymakers. 
            In the wake of 9/11 the American mass media did not all speak with one voice. 
There was room for dissent, protests of the treatment of Muslims, and protest against the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This study, however, focused on several Islamophobic 
trends that came to dominate many mainstream political discourses. The items selected 
for special scrutiny here were chosen because they demonstrated the characteristic 
problematic Islamophobic stance that was the focus of this dissertation. However, this 
was not meant to imply that all media pronouncements on Islam were of a single mind, or 
that no alternate or opposing frames surfaced during the historical period of primary 
interest. 
                                                               Summary 
            Using frame analysis, I examined the public record of politicians’ 
pronouncements over the Patriot Act in terms of two dominant frames, or deep narratives 
(Lakoff, 2008). The guiding research question was: how do American policymakers, 
news reporters, editorialists and political pundits attempt to construct a broad, social 
consensus by framing the issues in a particular manner? Three frames of particular 
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interest in this regard were the (a) Clash of Civilizations, (b) Endangered Constitutional 
Protections, and (c) Islamophobia, frames. I detail each of these frames below. 
           Clash of Civilizations frame – This frame posited a national existential threat from 
an irrational foreign enemy. The West represented by the United States as its central 
figure and key defender is both hero and victim, and Islamic terrorists are the villains. In 
this frame, Western civilization stood for science, democracy, progressive values such as 
women’s rights, and rationality; and Islamic civilization stood in opposition to these core 
values. As Kumar (2010) summarized it, in terms of the Clash of Civilizations frame, 
“Islam is a uniquely sexist religion, the ‘Muslim mind’ is incapable of rationality and 
science, Islam is inherently violent, and the West spreads democracy, while Islam spawns 
terrorism” (p. 254). In this frame, the West and Islam constituted two opposing 
civilizations that are natural enemies, and there is little chance at forging alliances across 
civilizational divides because the actual conflict is between fundamentally incompatible 
core value systems that have proven historically deep and resilient over the centuries 
(Huntington, 1993). 
            Endangered Constitutional Protections frame – This frame posited a defenders of 
democracy narrative.  Politicians who sought to expand government power at the 
expensive of citizens’ rights in the name of “protecting the homeland” against terrorism 
are the villains; the American people, especially Muslim-Americans as a targeted 
ethnic/religious group, but also the Christian majority, are the victims; and critics who 
oppose the expansion of government power are the heroes. This frame was used by 
politicians who argued against the Patriot Act in the first place as shown in Chapter 4; 
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and the larger group who later made a case for letting controversial provisions of the act 
expire (Concerned Citizens Against the Patriot Act, 2015). 
           This dissertation also explored a third frame, the Islamophobia frame, which has 
been used to challenge the Clash of Civilizations frame.  The first printed occurrence of 
the term Islamophobia in English appeared in a 1985 article by Edward Said, in which he 
defined it as hostility to Islam in the modern West and compared Islamiphobia to anti-
Semitism, claiming that anti-Islamic and anti-Jewish prejudices derived from the same 
source (Said, 1985, p. 105). The term was later defined in the British Runnymede Trust 
Report (1991) as "unfounded hostility towards Muslims, and therefore fear or dislike of 
all or most Muslims" (p. 1). The frame positioned Muslims as a persecuted minority 
group for interpreting the relations between Muslims and their critics in the post-911 
political climate. In this frame, Islamophobes are the villains, Muslims the victims, and 
anyone who condemns Islamophobia is a hero.  The -phobia suffix also carried 
associations of psychiatric disorder based in irrational fear or imagined threats (Plummer, 
1999). Framing critics of a group as sufferers of a phobia followed the politically 
effective homophobia frame that shifted implications of mental disorder/deviance from 
the homosexual to those who condemned or persecuted homosexuals. 
            I asserted that the clash of civilization frames in the American news media 
immediately following 9/11were epiphenomenal - a concept developed by Fox and Miller 
(1995) - in which perceptions were socially constructed through the manipulation of 
symbols that have been severed from objective reality. This epiphenomenal discourse 
was not grounded in a realistic assessment of actual terror threats, and it lacked even a 
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basic understanding of Muslim people and Islam as a religious practice. Anti-Islamic 
frames were disseminated by foreign policy hawks in the Bush Administration and 
political punditry in order to play on the general public’s fears of terrorism and thereby 
garner support for a foreign policy that came to be called the Global War on Terror. An 
unintended consequence of this socially constructed fear was the passing of new laws and 
law enforcement policies that corroded basic freedoms previously guaranteed by the 
Constitution. 
            By explicitly drawing attention to the Islamophobic implications of political 
frames in group discussions in this study, I sought to demonstrate the readiness of naive 
respondents to adopt a critical eye in assessing media manipulation and to raise 
awareness of social injustice that came in the wake of the manipulation. In place of the 
Islamophobic frames that were deployed to gain public support for the global war on 
terror in this study, I introduced alternate frames designed to garner sympathy for the 

















Chapter 2: Literature Review 
            My aim in this literature review was to evaluate contemporary literature on 
Islamophobia in the United States through the lens of national security, civil liberties, and 
media influence. Islamophobia as a political frame stands in tension with the democratic 
government’s charge to protect its citizens while securing their equal access to civil 
liberties. In the post-9/11 United States statute’s, justification and credibility has been 
promulgated by legislative acts, political banter, and mass media coverage that uses 
national security as a blanket to cover racial politics, making religious discrimination 
against Muslims an acceptable reality. 
 U.S. President James Madison and Prussian political philosopher Wilhelm von 
Humboldt presented the question of balancing national security and individual liberty as 
the fundamental conundrum of a democratic republic (Hardin, 2004).  In this study, I 
analyzed how this conundrum is addressed in terms of minority populations, specifically 
Muslim, and its implications for the greater society. Esposito (1992) and Said (1978) 
provided analyses of the historical context, explaining why Islam and the West have a 
contentious relationship. As a democratic republic, the United States has the 
constitutional separation of powers (executive, legislative, and judicial) ; however, as 
Poole and Richardson (2006) highlighted, mass media has become an integral fourth 
power in the 21st century. In this chapter, I explored the theoretical framework of the 
dissertation, the media influence in the promulgation of Islamophobia, and the theoretical 





Literature Search Strategy 
I searched the following databases from 2012 to the present for relevant studies in 
political framing and Islamophobia: Academic Search Complete, Expanded Academic 
ASAP, Google Scholar, International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center, 
Project Muse, ProQuest Central, and SocINDEX with Full Text. I used the following 
search terms and related synonyms separately and in combination: Islamophobia, jihad, 
terrorism, war on terror, Patriot Act, framing, propaganda, and news media. I limited the 
search to English language publications, and I assessed the results in terms of relevance, 
favoring peer-reviewed studies in academic journals. 
Theoretical Framework 
            The United States as a nation perennially faces the delicate task of balancing and 
maintaining security with the domestic civility of its citizens. During the debate by the 
Founding Fathers, there was acknowledgement that this task provided great hope while at 
the same time angst. In the crux of this debate lies the question for the United States of 
how can government be structured both to achieve security and to restrain itself from 
violating individual freedom? This dilemma for Humboldt (1969) “is the unrestricted 
opportunity to develop one’s own capacities” (p. 39). This same sentiment was a 
foundational argument for James Madison (1788), as early on in the nation’s history he 
postulated the central problem of the U.S. Constitution: “In framing a government which 
is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first 
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enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control 
itself.” 
The American Revolution began the long tradition of America’s consideration of 
how to protect the citizenry against invading armies—in particular the Red Coats. The 
issue lies in how this ideology in contemporary America has been aligned with the Global 
War on Terrorism and protection against terrorists. Terrorists are not so readily identified 
as armies, nor are they easily traceable. This has led to the alternative of protecting the 
country through the use of value judgments based upon a hypothetical profile that could 
be false. Relying upon profiling, in turn, courts the risk of pitting peaceful citizens 
against alien residents. 
            The rise of international terrorism has put current political theories to the test in 
part because these theories were devised to deal with domestic issues and institutions 
(Hardin, 1989). In terms of national security and civil liberties, some policymakers and 
media pundits would like to present the reality that the trade-off between security and 
civil liberties is an easy one. For these populations the desire for protection against 
terrorism is worth having the civil liberties of many people violated to get such 
protection. One such early champion was Dershowitz (2002), who argued forcefully for 
trading some civil liberty for protection against terrorism. He supposed even that torture 
could be justified by a sufficiently dreadful threat. It can be too easy to make such 
arguments if one focuses on the cases that, in the end, prove to have been genuine 
(Dershowitz, 2002). 
            Islamophobia in this context can be aligned to other U.S. historical time periods. 
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For instance, during the U.S. Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ 
of habeas corpus. In the post-Civil War era Jim Crow laws greatly restricted the 
movement and participation of African Americans in society. In World War II, tens of 
thousands of Japanese American citizens were interned in the Western deserts. When 
considering these individual decisions and how they violated civil liberties, how can 
Islamophobia not be seen and understood as an analogous matter of national concern? In 
the post-9/11 era it has become less certain that civil liberties will win the political 
support in a political climate governed by fleeting passions of majorities faced with 
threats of terrorism – which many take to be interchangeable with Islam. 
           One should consider the Federalist Papers when observing the U.S. government’s 
post-9/11 stance on terrorism as reinforcing the appeal of Madison’s liberal distrust. 
Pharr and Putnam (2000) have recently observed that U.S. citizens trust their government 
too little, and that trust in government is in decline. This is disturbing for a nation built on 
the notion of governing by the people. Pharr and Putnam wish to “restore” trust in 
government, although it is not at all clear that current levels of deference to and 
confidence in government are much lower than they were throughout most of U.S. 
history. Islamophobia provides a conundrum in that its presence is likely to increase the 
grounds for doubting the quality of government judgment in combating terrorism without 
grievously undercutting civil liberties. 
            The United States historically has dealt with the notion of opinions and racial 
discrimination. Throughout U.S. history, beginning with the Alien and Sedition Acts of 
1798, immigrants and minorities have suffered great legal setbacks in the pursuit of civil 
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liberties. Islamophobia, which means fear of Islam or Muslims is a new term to describe 
an old Westernized thought process. If Islamophobia can be considered a form of 
religious intolerance that can be observed throughout history and has led to various wars; 
one can consider the Crusades and genocides in this vein as part of the same 
phenomenon. The rise of Islam and the rate of growth of its reach were seen as a 
significant danger to other religions. The Western nations viewed this “new” religion as a 
potential global problem (Crone & Cook 1977; Fahlbusch 2001; Hamilton 1985; 
Southern 1962). Historically, this view of Islam has led to labeling Islam as immoral and 
heretical from a Christian perspective (Sardar 1999). 
            Contemporary literature in reference to hostility toward Islam and Muslims 
supplements what has been common in the past (Sardar, 1999). Many Westerners view 
Islam in the 21st century from an Orientalist perspective (Kumar, 2012). Orientalism is a 
term used to refer to the study of Middle Eastern, South Asian, and East Asian art, 
history, literature, language, and society by European and North American academics. 
Said (1978) critiqued such scholarship for its implicit support of Western imperialism and 
patronizing attitudes toward an “Oriental” other assumed to be less rational and 
intellectually underdeveloped. This vision can be compared to Huntington’s (1994) Clash 
of Civilizations paradigm where the world is divided in terms of what scholars called the 
Orient and the Occident. This division is clearly delineated along religious lines as Said 
(1978) observed and Norman Daniel (1960) affirmed the differences between these 
opposing forces, primarily is religion or culture. Daniel (1960) remarked on how Islam 
had been viewed by the Christian orthodoxy over recorded history. Poole (2002), in a 
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review of Daniel’s work, argued that anti-Islam rhetoric from Western commentators 
depicted Islam as a foreign threat and has served to limit the growth of Islam. 
            Another scholar that observed this delineation was Esposito (1992), who 
recognized the religious and ideological differences between Islam and West. This 
difference was also highlighted by Bhabha (1994) who characterized the division 
between the West and Islam along such dichotomies as center-margin, civilized-savage, 
and enlightened- ignorant. Halliday (2003, 1999) summarized the notion of Islam as the 
other and a threatening presence to the West. Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations 
paradigm asserts that there was a different and new Cold War that would take place. This 
new Cold War would not be based upon economics or politics but on culture and 
civilizations that are defined primarily in terms of religious conflicts. 
            To this end scholars have argued that Islam has been perceived as a political-
religious threat to the West. Scholars such as Ahmed (1993), Rodinson (1974), Savory 
(1980), Djerejian (1997), and Sayyid (1997) have all encapsulated Islam as a viable threat 
to the West in terms of Islam the religion, and the Western region, This was also the 
foundational principle of the Runnymede Trust, a left-wing think tank founded in 1968 in 
order to improve race relations in multi-ethnic Britain. Islamophobic bias has thus 
surfaced in unexpected places. 
            The prejudices and stereotypes perceived by the world in reference to Islam and 
Muslims has historical roots. These roots have become increasingly entrenched as the rise 
of jihad - holy war and the growing unrest in Islam dominated nations.  The term 
Islamophobia was adopted in response to this new climate. 
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Significance of the Media 
Mass media’s impact stems from the images, representation and communication 
exhorted from its stories and reports. In recent times, the images, representations and 
communication in reference to Islam and Muslims has been increasingly negative and 
derogatory, especially in the west (Poole & Richardson 2006). As in any blanket 
statement there are exceptions to the rules. In this dissertation, I primarily aim to 
highlight those incidents that directly impact the social and political atmosphere in the 
United States in a negative way. 
            The messages displayed and portrayed by the media aids in the development of 
political discourse and thus helps to shape public opinions. This process continues due to 
the immediate effects of media on the masses, which eventually results in the 
construction of a social reality that is based on media framing of a reality “in a 
predictable and patterned way” (McQuail, 1994, p. 331). However, the framing of 
political issues in the media is not alone in contributing the building of social reality. 
Individuals also play a role in the development of their own frames. According to Entman 
(1995) this is called information processing and plays a vital role in the framing process. 
In other words, the ultimate opinion or response of an individual is a synthesis of media 
frames that they are exposed to in addition to their individual frames. The work of Berger 
& Luckman (1966) and Tuchman (1978) offer highly influential analyses of the social 
construction of reality debate in this regard. 
             How does the use of media by politicians influence public opinion? With the use 
of framing and media, what does American future relationships in the global community 
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have to lose? The practice of framing involves choices concerning what is salient. A 
frame selects some aspect of reality or some subset of facts and highlights these as more 
salient in the text to be communicated. The result of such framing is to produce a 
narrative that promotes a particular causal interpretation, moral evaluation, or course of 
action. Frames are used to identify and characterize relevant agents, diagnose causes, and 
prescribe courses of action in response to reported events. Selection and framing choices 
typically assume cultural values and are not objective in terms of ethical judgments 
(Entman, 1993). 
            When considering the influence of media as an active participant in the formation 
of Islamophobia, this analysis uses a constructivist media effects model. This model 
explains how reality is built or framed using personal experiences along with the 
influence of mass media (Neuman et al., 1992). Here, such a model will provide an 
interactive approach to the construction of reality in terms of framing and the 
conceptualization and perception meant or perceived by the audience. 
            Taking the above into consideration along with the issue of framing, McCombs, 
Shaw and Weaver (1997) suggested that one should also consider the place of other 
effects of framing, such as framing as an extension of agenda setting. McCombs, Shaw 
and Weaver’s approach is far too complex for the scope of this work. Rather, the 
framework I deployed in this dissertation was based upon Luhmann’s (2000) argument of 
theories as realist epistemologies.  In his model, external values, such as truthfulness, 




Methodology of Theoretical Framework 
The conceptual foundation upon which this dissertation drew came from 
contemporary theories on framing in political communications and postmodern 
theoretical constructs of American politics that emerged during the 1990s. How can a 
democratic government be structured both to protect national security interests and 
restrain itself from violating individual freedom? This study investigates the vital role 
played by the media in the Unites States primarily in the use of Islamophobic framing, 
and its influence on foreign politics, public discourse and/or public opinion. 
            In 1996, El-Farra reported the U.S. press largely represented Muslims as 
caricatures or stereotypes in which any reference to a Muslim was almost always made in 
association with terms such as terrorists, fanatics, or extremists. This process of 
mischaracterization of Islam and Muslims became a more prevalent political frame after 
9/11. 
            In this dissertation, I analyzed the political reliance on media to instill 
Islamophobic discrimination within society. The significance of this analysis is the 
improvement of internal cultural relations along with the development of an international 
framework that is conducive to the 21st century global environment. Academic databases 
such as EBSCO, JSTOR, Congressional Quarterly, LexisNexis provided major sources 
for the material presented below. Keywords used in searches included: Islamophobia, 
civil liberties, racism, terrorist, fanatic, Islam, Muslim, and the USA PATRIOT Act. 
Postmodern Political Theory and Political Communications 
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            Postmodern political theory provided analysts such as Charles Fox and Hugh 
Miller a basis by which to critique American politics in the 1990s (Fox, 2006; Fox & 
Miller, 1995; Scott, 1997; Miller, 2002; Miller & Fox, 2007). Fox and Miller (1995; 
2007) argued that American public policy making had undergone a fundamental 
transformation. They characterized this transformation in terms of a departure from a 
period in which policy formulation and implementation were defined by rational 
neutrality, objectivity, and managerialism to one defined by constructions of public 
discourse by which journalists, activists, experts, and politicians struggled to produce 
meanings that influenced policy. This struggle to construct and control public narratives 
marked a fundamental break with the past, justifying the division of history into modern 
and postmodern eras (Fox, 1996). 
            In the postmodern period, political communications increasingly became 
characterized by the news media as a forum for deception, marked by commercialism, 
political slur campaigns, and shallow political journalism made up of photo ops, celebrity 
endorsements, and personal attacks (Miller & Fox, 2007). Political communications – or 
the means by which political meanings are produced and disseminated – thus play a 
central role in the postmodernist critique (Burnier, 2005). 
            Hyper-reality is reflected in the rapidity and velocity with which information is 
transmitted by contemporary media technology – television, the Internet, smartphones, 
and other electronic communications devices and forums (Miller & Fox, 2007). However, 
within the postmodernist critique, the hyper-reality that characterizes contemporary 
political communications is not held as being conducive to effective public policy 
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making. According to Miller and Fox (2007), the emergent hyper-reality of the heavily 
sensationalized and commercialized news media renders the media useless for 
meaningful policymaking that promotes national interests. Instead, contemporary news 
reporting and editorializing has devolved into a spectacle or an entertaining diversion, 
where signs are divorced from reality. In place of fact-based reporting, the media 
produces a rapid sequence of symbols and images lacking clear referents that create a 
kind of epiphenomenal experience that displaces genuine political analysis and debate. 
            Furthermore, Miller and Fox (2007) pointed to a monological quality that has 
come to imbue hyper-real political communications. This is characterized by 
pronouncements of questionable truth value that go unchallenged.  In sum, a key 
argument put forth by Fox and Miller in their theory of postmodern discourse is that 
within the context of hyper-reality, symbolic political messaging has replaced rational 
political analysis based on realistic assessments (Miller & Fox, 2007). 
            The postmodernist arguments advanced by Fox and Miller have not been without 
criticism. Burnie in particular argued that there is little empirical evidence to demonstrate 
how postmodern constructs are manifest in practice, writing that if postmodernism is to 
truly effect positive change it must include empirical research into how information is 
produced and disseminated (Burnier, 2005). Along the subjective-objective spectrum of 
methodological approaches to public opinion analysis, there are those scholars who take a 
positivist approach, seeking to base their claims in objective facts. Post-positivists, in 
contrast, accept the limits of positivism, talk about probability rather than certainty, and 
consider the limits of objectivity (Crotty, 1998). For them, qualitative research becomes 
44 
 
an important complement to quantitative methods, filling out detail where the latter falls 
short. 
            On the opposite end of the continuum is postmodernism, which seeks to replace 
the decontextualized abstractions of positivism with more subjective inquiries that 
capture multiple voices and perspectives in local contexts. Postmodernists assume that 
theories only provide partial views of their objects and that every representation of the 
world is filtered through history and language, which can never be neutral or entirely 
objective (Best & Kellner, 1991). In contrast to the realism of post-positivists, 
postmodernists explore how language, power and history shape human views of reality, 
truth and knowledge, aiming to uncover multiple realities. Postmodernists also tend to 
favor critical methods that are intrinsically qualitative (Hollinger, 1994). 
            Postmodernists have claimed that in a media saturated world, where there is 
constant immersion in media, the distinction between reality and the media representation 
of reality becomes blurred (McDougall, 2001). Communication theorists argued that 
members of the public no longer have any sense of the difference between reality and 
simulated images; hence media reality is the new reality (Kellner, 1989). Opponents of 
postmodern theory, such as Strinati (2005), argued that this view was just a new way of 
thinking about media. 
            As an intellectual challenge to modernist theoretical approaches, postmodernist 
theorists aimed to elevate text and language as a method of critique of Western 
institutions. They applied literary analysis to social problems, while questioning reality 
and representation. Some postmodern critics assume that value-free objectivity is 
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impossible, as it requires a separation between moral and objective models.  D’Andrade 
(1995), a cognitive anthropologist, argued that postmodern approaches are counter-
productive for discerning how the world works. His critique of postmodern theory offers 
an alternative view, claiming the impact of media on the development of public opinion 
in America is better understood as a by-product of the Western emphasis on 
individualism. 
             An extremely common move in the debate about the dumbing down of culture 
and policymaking generally is to accuse the other side of elitism. Thus, proponents of the 
popularization of media to appeal to a broader audience accuse those who wish to 
preserve the hierarchies of the past of one type of elitism. Meanwhile, those advocating 
for a more educative role for mass media accuse their opponents of assuming that the 
public in general is only interested in “trash,” which is an equally elitist perspective. 
When both sides in a debate launch identical accusations against one another, we can be 
quite certain that we are in a closed universe of discourse, and that no real understanding 
will be achieved until we step outside that frame. 
            One of the most highly developed academic debates of recent times has been the 
debate concerning the decline of modernity, in this study interpreted as the traditio nal 
structures and cultures of liberal democratic nation-state. The institutions of the nation-
state were in principle the vehicle for the realization of the Enlightenment project. The 
goal of this project was the constant march forward of human society under the guiding 
hand of reason. Under these ideological assumptions, an indefinite, never-ending 
progress of the species was assured.  The emergence of postmodern theory challenges 
46 
 
that view. Postmodernism provided an alternative worldview that challenged the 
dominant Enlightenment institutions and values (Jameson, 1991). 
The Concept of Framing 
Scholars have long been interested in how arguments are framed in order to shape 
public opinion in the context of public policy. Framing theory has been widely accepted 
by a range of scholars and has become a standard method for studying public policy 
(Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). The study of how citizens’ political judgments are 
influenced by strategic framing of the issues goes back half a century in the social 
sciences (Druckman, 2001). 
            The roots of framing as a conceptual construct can be traced to the work of Walter 
Lippmann (1922) in his seminal book Public Opinion. Lippmann observed that in a 
democracy, most citizens spend most of their time and energy involved in family, work, 
recreation, and other social and religious activities of a personal nature. Lippmann argued 
that to most people, public policy is remote, complex, and of secondary interest. As a 
result, the politically unmotivated majority develops only a shallow and unreliable and 
ill-informed knowledge base upon which to form political preferences (Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld & McPhee, 1954). Lippmann pointed to the media – which was largely 
comprised of newspapers and radio in Lippmann’s day – as the primary source through 
which people derived political information.  He noted that the second-hand knowledge 
people derived from the media was subject to being manipulated by media outlets 
through rhetoric and persuasion (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, & Shapiro, 2007). 
            Scholarly Interest in framing and public policy grew during the 1980s when, for 
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example in a highly influential article, Gamson and Modigliani (1987) utilized content 
analysis to demonstrate how during the 1980s arguments over affirmative action were 
transformed from being defined in terms of an underserved advantage frame to a reverse 
discrimination frame by affirmative action opponents. In his 1992 book Talking Politics, 
Gamson (1992) described how media discourse consisted of interpretative packages 
giving meaning to an issue or event in the public domain. At the center of these packages 
was a central organizing idea, or frame. By incorporating and condensing a set of 
metaphors, catch phrases, visual images, moral appeals, and other symbolic devices, 
frames can be used to supply citizens with a readily comprehensible basis upon which 
they can think about political issues and determine their political preferences (Sniderman 
& Theriault, 2004). 
            Entman (1993) described framing in terms of communication that selects certain 
aspects of reality so as to promote the perception of a particular problem, sequence of 
causal events, or moral evaluation. The key character of framing is to thematically 
convey selected attributes for communication in a materially compelling manner 
(McCombs, 1997). According to Schuefele and Tewksbury (2007), the point at which 
framing became truly systematized in American political discourse and of interest to 
contemporary scholars can be traced to 1997. This was one year after Miller and Fox 
(2006) published the first edition of their book Post-Modern Public Administration, 
which began to set out in comprehensive form their discourse theory. It was also the year 
that Republican political pollster Frank Luntz circulated a 222-page memo to Republican 
members of Congress titled ‘‘Language of the 21st century” (Schuefele & Tewksbury, 
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2007). Luntz’s memo analyzed testing and focus groups to identify terms and phrases that 
resonated with different audiences and helped change people’s attitudes. Luntz argued 
that for effective political messaging how one says something is often more important 
than what one says (Schuefele & Tewksbury, 2007). 
            Luntz was followed by Lakoff, who published Don’t Think of an Elephant - a 
manual instructing liberals on how to successfully frame their own messages. According 
to Schuefele and Tewksbury (2007), framing in the political context today manifests 
exactly the type of hyper-realist, epiphenomenal discourse posited by Fox and Miller 
(2006). 
Framing by Politicians 
Within a framing construct of political discourse, how citizens think about an 
issue depends upon how it is framed. Frames are constructions of issues, and as 
constructions they convey how an issue should be thought about and what if anything 
should be done (Nelson & Kinder, 1996). Studies in framing demonstrate that large 
numbers of people can swing from one side of an issue to the opposite side depending on 
how the issue is framed (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). According to Druckman (2001), 
politicians, activists, and the media constantly frame issues and use these frames to 
manipulate citizens’ preferences. 
            It has long been established that “mediated political communication is carried on 
by an elite” (Habermas, 2006, para. 18). Framing constitutes a process by which political 
elites and news media coverage shape mass opinion (Scheufele, 1999). Framing is one of 
the most important means of elite influence on public opinion (Slothus & de Vreese, 
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2010). Elites rely on mass media as the instrument with which to shape public opinion in 
pursuit of their policy agendas. 
            Thomas Dye (2000), C. Wright Mills (1956), and Simon and Xenos (2000)  
pointed to political elites as being composed of individuals occupying the top positions of 
major political, economic, legal, educational, cultural, scientific, and civic institutions. 
Politicians, who are individuals elected to political office through the democratic process, 
provide the link between political elites and the citizenry, and politicians point to their 
policy achievements to appeal to voters (Kitschelt, 2000). 
            In sum, framing theory posits that politicians play a central role as interlocutors in 
framing public policy issues before citizens on behalf of political elites. The theory does 
not posit that how politicians frame issues alone dictates the public policy preferences of 
citizens. How citizens view issues and policy alternatives also reflects citizen 
predispositions, schema and other characteristics (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). In 
practice, politicians can have a difficult time manipulating citizens because their 
opponents are also engaged in framing. 
            Faced with divergent frames, an individual’s policy preferences are likely to be 
grounded in his or her own underlying principles (Sniderman & Theriault, 1999). Still, 
politicians must believe framing is effective given the degree to which it has become a 
fundamental component of American political discourse. It follows then that by invoking 
a particular frame in their communications, politicians seek, if not to control, to 
significantly influence public attitudes in terms of how the public perceives public policy 
issues. Framing constitutes a “battle over hearts and minds of citizens” involving 
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attempts to shape the way in which choices are presented and discussed in the media 
(Carpini, 2004, p. 21). 
                                        Relevant Studies in Political Framing 
            With regard to the subject of this dissertation, a small number of recent studies 
have examined how discourses concerning Muslims are framed in the Western media in 
the post-9/11 period. These include Frost (2008) and Saeed (2007), who utilized content 
analysis to examine such frames in the British media. Closer to home, Trevino, Kanso, 
and Nelson (2010) analyzed content from three U.S. newspapers – The New York Times, 
The Washington Post, and The Los Angeles Times – to compare how these papers framed 
stories on Muslims before and after 9/11. They concluded, “each newspaper had allotted 
more unfavorable terms than favorable and neutral terms combined for both periods...the 
dominant negative terms labeled Muslims as terrorists, extremists, fundamentalists, 
radicals, and fanatics” (para. 1). 
           Salim (2010) analyzed the content of American media, coding stereotypical words 
such as radical, conflict, violent, and extremist. Salim (2010) found a general trend of 
negative messages and unbalanced reporting in the way stories concerning Muslims were 
framed. Similarly, using content analysis in a study on how the U.S. media portrays 
Muslims, Jackson (2010) concluded that the media portrays Muslims in negative, 
stereotypical ways, especially since 9/11. Jackson (2007) concluded that the media has 
tended to use frameworks centered on violent threats, extremism, and terrorism in its 
portrayal of Muslims. 
            It is important to recall that frames need not be accurately rooted in reality. For 
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example, Jackson (2007) noted that the media portrayals he reviewed misleadingly 
depicted Muslims and Islam as a uniform monolith. In reality, for a group consisting of 
over a billion people with majorities in over 50 countries, Muslims as a group are 
difficult to generalize about (Jackson, 2007). Nor do these frames used to depict Muslims 
necessarily serve the public good. 
            The effects of message flows on public opinion and policy preferences have been 
subject to considerable research. In a study somewhat related to that of this dissertation, 
Nacos, Bloch-Elkon and Shapiro (2007) analyzed the content of remarks made by 
members of the George W. Bush Administration and its War on Terror. Nacos and 
colleagues concluded that the administration’s frames played into the hands of the al-
Qaeda leadership by conveying that the organization’s goal of striking fear into 
Americans was succeeding (Nacos et al., 2007). In other words, if the administration’s 
goal was to enhance the sense of security among the American people, its framing of the 
threat as a Global War on Terrorism was actually working at cross purposes. 
            Deepa Kumar’s (2010, 2012) research into Islamophobia and its consequences is 
central to this dissertation, as she has done much to develop this concept in relation to the 
U.S. administration’s responses to 9/11. In Kumar’s (2010) essay “Framing Islam: The 
Resurgence of Orientalism During the Bush II Era,” she explored how the Clash of 
Civilizations paradigm became the dominant political logic in the post-9/11 Bush 
Administration. 
            Kumar (2010) summarized Islamophobic rhetoric in terms of five false 
generalizations: (1) Islam is monolithic; (2) Islam is uniquely sexist; (3) Islam is 
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inherently violent and intolerant; (4) The "Muslim mind" is incapable of reason and 
science; and (5) the West spreads democracy, while Islam spawns terrorism. 
            Kumar has exposed each of these generalizations as false. Islam is not monolithic, 
as it is practiced in dozens of countries and divided into Sunni and Shiite branches. Islam 
is no more or less sexist than other Abrahamic religions, and many American Christians 
still believe the Bible teaches that wives should submit to their husbands (Blake, 2014). 
Those who depict Islam as advocating violence often misinterpret the term jihad to mean 
waging a holy war, rather than primarily an internal struggle to overcome weakness 
(BBC, 2009). The characterization of the “Muslim mind” as “irrational” or “pre-
scientific” is an old slur rooted in the Orientalism of the colonial period (Said, 1978). 
Although the claim that America’s war efforts in the Middle East and elsewhere were 
motivated primarily by the desire to spread “democracy” or “freedom,” this rationale was 
contested even domestically (Ignatieff, 2005). 
Saliency of the Literature 
With regard to this literature review, several salient points emerge. First, recent 
years have seen a shift in the nature of political discourses surrounding the Middle East 
and Islam in the United States from those that did not draw upon the Clash of 
Civilizations narrative and its Islamophobic implications to those that did. Politicians 
framed their arguments in terms of fear of the Islamic terrorist in order to build public 
support for their policy agendas. These frames were epiphenomenal in the sense that they 
were more based in emotionally charged rhetoric and empty symbolism than in any 
connection to realistic threats and accurate portrayals of Islam. 
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            This review of the literature covered research that examined framing with regard 
to Muslims in the post-9/11 era. Many examples of discourses on Muslims have been 
found to be framed in negative terms. However, these studies have been limited in 
number. There is a significant gap in the academic literature about framing and media 
manipulation in the context of the Global War on Terrorism. Furthermore, few studies 
have focused specifically upon the Patriot Act, as discussed in the statement of the 
problem. The renewal of this law represented one of the most salient and contentious 
public policy issues before Congress in 2011, with significant implications for the 
American people as a whole and for Muslim-Americans in particular. 
            Lastly, the literature review pointed to content analysis as the principal research 
methodology used in scholarly research on framing. Chapter 3 will describe how content 













Chapter 3: Research Method 
 In my research, I used qualitative methods for evaluating U.S. political rhetoric 
concerning Islam and Muslims post-9/11. The concept of framing was used to analyze the 
language politicians and news commentators when discussing topics such as terrorism, 
Islam, and Muslims. 
Research Design and Rationale 
            When designing the current study on Islamophobia and framing, I had to 
determine whether quantitative or qualitative research methods would be better suited to 
the subject matter. Quantitative research methods express data in the form of variables 
while qualitative research methods express data in the form of generalizations (Monette, 
et al., 2005). Qualitative methods are best used when the research aim is to represent the 
subject in a specific context, versus the universal or abstract generalizations that result 
from statistical analysis using quantitative methods (Monette et al., 2005). 
            To understand the historically specific subject matter of this study, I decided to 
look at words, images and transcripts representing highly politicized content over a 
limited time frame and in response to particular historical events.  The specificity of the 
social context of this rhetoric, and its politicized nature, called for a more subjective, 
interpretive, and evaluative analysis. In contrast, a quantitative model would have been 
better suited to randomized data collection and hypothesis testing. This study was 
formulated with the intent of seeking out and evaluating certain kinds of rhetoric used to 
bolster political positions at a particular point in U.S. history rather than arrive at general 
55 
 
hypotheses. The subject matter therefore seemed more amenable to a more 
contextualizing rather than generalizing approach, thus favoring quantitative methods. 
Role of the Researcher 
            My role in the research process was as an analyst of media articles intended to 
communicate to the general public interpretations of news reports in a variety of new 
media having to do with terrorism following the September 11, 2001 attack on the World 
Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon, in Arlington County, Virginia. My role 
included (a) finding articles written across the U.S. political spectrum; (b) screening these 
articles using theoretical and conceptual frameworks found in the literature; (c) thematic 
coding of the content; (d) conducting a qualitative NVivo software analysis sorting and 
grouping coded portions of the articles into nodal and thematic groupings; and (e) 
conducting a frame analysis of 10 cases of lethal terrorist attacks since 9/11. 
Methodology: Content Analysis 
Content analysis is a methodology used for analyzing written, verbal, or visual 
communication messages. Content analysis is a research technique entailing the 
specification material of interest in a data set, often consisting of words or texts, then 
extracting that material for analysis (Smith, 2000). According to Hsieh and Shannon 
(2005), content analysis offers the researcher a method for coding and identifying themes 
in text data that allows for subjective interrelation of content. Kippendorf (1989) has 
referred to content analysis as a context-dependent analysis that enables interpretation of 
the meanings originally attributed to the material. The content analysis methodology as a 
research process is one that engenders a degree of originality in its approach because it is 
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a research method that is inherently dependent on both the interpretation and the 
creativity of the individual researcher. This is because the content analysis research 
method allows each researcher to develop his or her own set of thematic categories 
relative to the topic of the study in question. Thus, both the topic of the research study as 
well as the approach to analysis is original in their context and approach. However, 
because the content analysis methodology is also grounded in established research, it is 
never allowed to stray beyond originality into nonacademically supported areas such as 
fiction or biography. 
            Frame analysis is a subset of content analysis. The concept of frames has been 
identified as a principal qualitative research methodology used to examine political 
discourse (Tankard, 2001). The linguist Lakoff (2004, 2008) focused on frame analysis to 
analyze political discourse that flourished during the time frame of this study. 
            The study involved no live population sampling. Instead, in the first phase of the 
study, it involved selection of 44 news media articles selected from both conservative and 
liberal news publications over a period of 15 years from 2001 through 2016–a period 
following the 9/11 attacks (see Appendix A). The statements surveyed represented a 
variety of opinions across the political spectrum. The frames discovered represent the 
institutional interests and political agendas of a range of different institutions, including 
the press, elected officials, and heads of government agencies. This represents the 
multivocal nature of contemporary political discourses in the United States. Some of the 
frames explored represent Islamophobic discourses and attempts to increase the reach of 




            To collect content for the first phase of this study, I drew on the congressional 
record, seeking out pronouncements of members of Congress during the study period – 
beginning on February 1, 2011 and ending on May 26, 2011. These were the months 
during which discourse revolving around reauthorization of the Patriot Act was most 
pronounced. It included the period during which hearings by Representative King and 
Senator Durbin were held and ended with signing of the Patriot Act reauthorization by 
President George W. Bush. Data consisted of spoken words or text attributed to members 
of the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate during the study period as reported 
in 10 Internet media news outlets. These are the Internet news portals for Yahoo News, 
CNN, MSNBC, Google News, New, The York Times, Huffington Post, Fox News, Digg, 
The Washington Post and The Los Angeles Times. Selection of these Internet portals as 
the source of data collection was based upon the following three factors: 
           First is the rise of the Internet as a primary source from which the American 
people obtain their news. According to a study released by the Pew Research Center for 
People and the Press (Pew, 2011, Jan.4), in 2010, 43% of Americans reported that the 
Internet served as their primary source for obtaining national and international news. The 
Internet trailed television as a news source – 66% of American pointed to television as 
their primary source of news coverage. However. between 2007 and 2010, the number of 
18 to 29 year-olds citing the Internet as their main source of news nearly doubled, from 
34% to 65%. Among those 30 to 49 years old, 48% obtained their news from the Internet 
compared to 63% from television (only 31% cited newspapers as their primary source of 
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news). According to Pew (2011), trends point to the Internet overtaking television as the 
main source of news for the American people in the next few years. 
            Second, this study was undertaken retroactively. Simply put, Internet news 
content with which to collect the data from the study period is easily accessible. In 
contrast, collecting data from television broadcasts that have occurred in the past would 
be highly complicated under any reasonable assumptions.  
            The third factor weighing upon selection of these Internet news portals for data 
collection stemmed from the fact that they are the 10 most heavily trafficked American 
Internet news sites. This is according to eBizMBA Rank (2011), which monitors and 
reports on Internet traffic. If news content on the public pronouncements of members of 
Congress and senators is likely to be reported in the news, it is likely to be reported on 
these news web portals. In sum, the decision to utilize these Internet sites for data 
collection reflects the fact that they are a highly trafficked and validated as leading 
sources of news coverage and provide an easily accessible source of data collection. 
            Additionally,  in order to further explore the implications of anti-Islamic frames 
and the loss of political freedoms, I conducted a frame analysis survey of 10 high profile 
deadly attacks reported in the national news media in which the Muslim identity of the 
killer was highlighted and questions of jihadist terrorism were raised (see Appendix B). 
This phase of the study addressed the problem of scare-mongering in U.S. political 
discourse around the threat of Islamic terrorism. I used frame analysis to explore how 




Data were collected from the texts of published media reports and articles. A 
complete list of the documents used in this study can be found in Appendix A. There 
were no other types of instruments prepared for surveys.  Despite its widespread use, 
content analysis involves some inherent limitations in terms of reliability and validity. 
Validity refers to the degree to which coding judgments are objective and not subjective. 
Reliability refers to the degree to which coding is consistent. Content analysis also 
presents limitations in terms of reliability (Bolognesi, Pilgram, & Van Heerik, 2017; 
Saldaña, 2016). 
The data were compiled using QSR International’s NVivo (Version 11) computer 
software and this data was analyzed following constant comparative analysis (Bogdan & 
Biklen, 1998; Weber, 1990) and coding procedures (Saldaña, 2016) assisted by the 
NVivo software as follows: (a) collected observations, (b) sought key issues that could 
become categories of focus, (c) observed what provided elements of the categories of 
focus, (d) wrote about the categories accounting for all elements of observations, (e) 
continued working with the observations to present the emerging themes to discover 
relationships between categories, and (f) connected categorical relationships by recoding 
and writing to analyze the focal points of the core categories. 
            Following Saldaña’s (2016) qualitative research strategies, the key to producing a 
reliable content analysis involves proper delineation of categories and a coding 
instrument that clearly and consistently provides guidelines for data classification. The 
delineation of categories were arrived at through the steps described by Bogdan and 
Biklen (1998) and Saldaña (2016). Essential to the reliability of content analysis are clear 
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and consistent coding rules (Saldaña, 2016). Reliable classification procedures are critical 
to the task of drawing inferences from a text. Classifications must therefore be consistent, 
and coding categories exhaustive. Mutually exclusive categories allows the researcher to 
place relevant themes in one category, so that data does not blur over into alternative 
categories (Weber, 1990). 
            The challenges posed in terms of validation stems from the fact that content 
analysis relies on inference and context to define intent by a speaker or writer and that it 
is important for the analyst to avoid inserting personal bias into the analysis. Here arises 
the concern of what questions will emerge when conducting the content analysis. 
Whether the information was received from a primary or secondary source, what is the 
subject’s political awareness and the stage of the policy process a given message was 
transmitted. A well-developed coding instrument can help address reliability and validity 
concerns. Likewise, use of computerized content software can help reduce these threats. 
Data Analysis: Categories and Coding 
Data analysis included the systematic coding of key ideas, use of computer 
software (NVivo, version 11) to seek response patterns, and use of constant comparative 
analysis of all data sources seeking to identify themes. I pre-coded potential categories 
(Saldaña, 2016), then entered the codes and the 44 news media articles listed in Appendix 
A into the software data base. I went through each of the articles applying the precoding 
to sections of those articles. When that step was completed, I compiled all codes that 
were similar with each other, merging similar codes, and recoding data into 
subcategorical themes where possible (Vaismoradi, Jones, Turunen, & Snelgrove, 2016).  
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The themes were then compared to consider how they might be similar or different and 
how they may be related to one another (Vaismoradi et al., 2016).  If there were enough 
themes to form into meta-themes, they were further grouped into suggested categories 
and theoretical constructs. A write-up subsequently described each of the constructs and 
how they related or integrated with one another (Saldaña, 2016). This was accompanied 
by construction of frequency distributions on a number of the mega-themes.  This is a 
process known as the constant comparative method where observations can develop step-
by-step into a core of emergent conceptualization and theory (Glaser, 1978).  The process 
of constant comparative analysis was then followed described by Kolb (2012) and Glaser 
(1978), which consisted of six steps: 
(a)  Observations were collected of the article descriptions, inferences, and implications; 
(b) The key issues were sought that would later become focal points of the categories; 
(c)  Observations were made that provided many elements of the categories of most 
concern; 
(d) Subcategories were documented and written about, then described and accounted for 
all things within the observations while new ideas continued to be searched for; 
(e) Observations were worked with to present the emerging themes to discover 
relationships of categories; and 
The relationships of categories were connected through sampling, then coding and finally 
writing to analyze focal points and core categories. 
            Events can be framed in terms of identifying perpetrators, victims, motives, and 
calls for action that direct the target audience to respond in a certain manner. Frames 
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consist of simpler components, or memes, which in turn often conglomerate into sets of 
symbolic associations, or meme-complexes (Spitzberg, 2014). Memes are units of 
cultural transmission, analogous to genes, which are the basic units of biological 
transmission (Dawkins, 1989). Memes are aggregations of symbols that convey 
identifiable ideas and are transmitted socially through words, images, gestures, melodies, 
catchphrases, or other imitable phenomena. When a frame, as a complex of associated 
memes, becomes widely recognized or familiar in a culture, the entire frame may be 
evoked or activated in the minds of the culturally competent by a few keywords or other 
kinds of shorthand (Lakoff, 2007). By analyzing the reporting of various mass killings 
with possible jihadist associations in the national news media in the United States since 
9/11, I showed that reporters and editors often selected two dominant frames to explain 
these events: 1) the organized terrorism frame, and 2) the mental illness frame. 
            The organized terrorism frame can be identified by certain keywords or memes. 
This frame makes an association between Islam and terrorism, sometimes implicitly. 
Specific terms that may evoke the organized terrorism frame include: terrorist, 
radicalized, and anti-American. Since 9/11, the organized terrorism frame has often 
incorporated an Islamic terrorism meme, which can be evoked by mentioning ISIS, Al-
Qaeda, or martyrdom. The prominent featuring of a Muslim name or Middle-Eastern 
family background in the context of a mass murder or killing spree may be sufficient to 
evoke this larger frame. 
            The mental illness frame is also commonly used to explain seemingly random 
killings of strangers. Unlike the organized terrorism frame, the mental illness frame does 
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not explain the killer’s motives in terms of radicalization, martyrdom, or racial or 
religious outsider categories. The killer’s motives are instead described as “senseless” or 
“inexplicable,” and the killer is said to be acting on a breakdown of his1 mental capacities 
rather than implementing any ideological or political objectives. 
            In analyzing the framing of these attacks, I considered five aspects of the 
reporting: (1) characterization of the event itself, (2) actors involved, (3) instruments 
deployed, (4) suspected motives, (5) responses. Characterization of the event considers 
the language used to describe what happened. Descriptive accounts may range from 
strictly factual to emotionally charged. Specific codes were applied to language 
characterizing the actors includes how the perpetrator, victims, and heroes (if any). An 
instance of the organized terrorism frame was identified when the perpetrators were 
identified as terrorists killing for an ideological cause. Reports were coded as examples of 
the mental illness frame when perpetrators were described as mentally unstable with 
opaque or unknown motives 
            Once the data for the first phase of the study was collected, I needed a way to 
organize and process the texts. I used Weber’s (1990) approach to units of analysis, 
seeking out clusters of words with similar meaning or connotations. Coding these clusters 
involved describing and classifying units in terms of categories of select analytical 
constructs (Kippendorf, 1989). According to Hsieh and Shannon (2005), categories and a 
coding scheme for content analysis can be derived from three sources: the data, previous 
related studies, and theories. When data fitting the parameters stipulated above was 




identified in the Internet sources, discourse was coded for analysis. 
            For classification of data, content analysis categories were defined as posited per 
the three schemata referenced above in the statement of the problem – Islamophobia, 
Clash of Civilizations, and Endangered Constitutional Protections. As noted above, a 
basis for coding schemes for the Islamophobia frame already existed in prior studies 
(Frost, 2008; Gardner, Karakasoglus & Luchtenberg, 2009; Jackson, 2010; Saeed, 2007; 
Salim, 2010). 
            Themes for coding included the words: Muslim, Islam, terrorism, violence, and 
threats. These terms were used for initial coding the Clash of Civilizations frame. The 
Clash of Civilizations frame interpreted attacks by Muslims as part of a foreign threat to 
Western civilization, waging a war along deep historical cultural and value divides 
between incommensurable religious rifts that go back centuries.  Terms referenced above 
in the statement of problem were useful for initial coding the Endangered Constitutional 
Protections frame included: civil rights, civil liberties, law abiding, and patriotic. These 
words provided a point of departure for coding. 
            The content analyses in this study was organized in two ways: 1) by frequency 
distribution of words, nodes, and themes, and 2) by evaluation the inferences of 
pronouncements and assertions.  Frequency distributions of themes were performed 
through the use of an NVivo 11 Software database that used precoding and post-coding 
of terms and concepts found in 44 preselected media articles. Evaluation of the inferences 
of pronouncement and assertions was performed both by precoding and studying the new 
words, as well as lengthier pronouncements such as sentences that emerged during 
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analysis of the content. As additional words and phrases were identified, they were 
incorporated into the coding process. 
           Coding involves analyzing spoken or written language in numeric terms (Saldaña, 
2016). A coding instrument was developed to classify words and text. For the purpose of 
this dissertation, the coding instrument consisted of the name of the Internet news source, 
the name of the congressperson cited, and whether the statement suggested a Clash of 
Civilizations or Endangered Constitutional Protections frame. In addition, data on the 
party affiliation and how members of Congress cited voted either aye or nay to 
reauthorize the Patriot Act provisions. Coding was also assigned to the manner of 
reporting on instruments, such as firearms or explosive devices, used in carrying out the 
crimes. Under the framing of motivations, I considered whether the acts were depicted as 
random, inexplicable events beyond anyone’s ability to predict or circumvent, or if they 
were intentional acts of terrorism or martyrdom. Under the responses category, I 
considered both how those close to the event responded in the moment and the immediate 
aftermath, as well as prognoses of the situation and future calls to action. 
Drawing and Reporting Conclusions 
            Formulating meaningful conclusions constitutes the most important phase of a 
content analysis (Kippendorf, 1989). In this study, textual analysis involved applying the 
knowledge about how the coded data related to the framing categories and resulting 
implications with regard to the USA PATRIOT Act reauthorization. Conclusions were 
analyzed for presentation in Chapter 4 in a systematic form to demonstrate the way 
congressional discourse was framed in evaluating the hypotheses. The second phase of 
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the study added an additional level of evaluations and associations that were also be 
reported below. 
Trustworthiness 
Accuracy of Discourse 
This study follows Guba and Lincoln’s (1985) four criteria for judging the 
soundness of qualitative research. These are credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability. Guba and Lincoln explicitly offered these as an alternative to those 
criteria commonly used to evaluate quantitative research. I discuss each of these criteria 
in greater detail below. 
Credibility 
            The study met most of the following criteria asserted by Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
to evaluate and confirm the study credibility as described below: 
Adoption of research methods well established in qualitative investigation in 
general and in information science in particular. The research design followed the 
procedures of an exploratory descriptive qualitative multiple case study research design 
of data sources that are generally established in qualitative investigation.  The exploratory 
approach allowed exploration circumstances and contexts where there were no clearly 
expected outcomes at the outset (Yin, 2017). The descriptive case study approach is used 
to describe a phenomenon within actual contexts where they occurred (Yin, 2017). 
            The development of an early familiarity with the culture of participating 
organizations before the first data collection dialogues take place. An early 
familiarity with news organization culture and biases (see Appendix C) was developed 
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through background research. This research enabled me to understand much of what 
might be expected in the way of framing and content from media outlets. These sources 
told me that Islamic terrorism and a foreign threat were common themes in post-9/11 
national discourse.  
            Triangulation. Alternative methods of observation and research were pursued in 
this study to find alternative sources of corroborating evidence.  Frame analysis was 
conducted on 44 articles by analyzing both in depth meaning of the content within 
articles written by a variety of mass media sources; NVivo 11 database software analysis 
was conducted using coding schemes combined with frame analysis to generate 
frequency distributions on key themes and subthemes found in the 44 mass media articles 
(see Tables 1-9); and multiple case study frame analysis was conducted on mass media 
reports following 10 violent incidents with U.S. national borders, claiming 95 lives that 
were investigated for jihadism (see Appendix B).   
            Thick description of the phenomenon under scrutiny.  Detailed descriptions of 
the study phenomenon and context in the literature review Chapter 2 were provided. 
Detailed descriptions are also provided in Chapter 4. Finally, extensive descriptions of 
the study meaning, implications, significance, and conclusions are provided in Chapter 5. 
Transferability 
            Transferability of the findings of this research study was intentionally limited to 
contexts with nearly identical description, characteristics, and likeness as distinguished 
from broad generalizability (Geertz, 1973; Guba, 1981). This was thought of as a valued 
tradeoff for potentially rich insights about unknown aspects of jihadism, terrorism, 
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Islamophobia, and Islam. Qualitative research design was selected to explore a gap in the 
literature expressed in RQ1, RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4 in context of the research problem and 
purpose as described in Chapter 1. What could be transferred by this study are likely to 
be limited insights and recommendations for future research. 
Dependability 
This study was admittedly limited by the selection criteria of the documents 
reviewed and the framing of the research questions. Since qualitative research may 
sacrifice statistically decisive outcomes in favor or a thick and rich description of the 
phenomenon under observation, and since qualitative research may incorporate the 
subjective interpretations of the researcher, replicability depends to a significant extent on 
the starting assumptions of the researcher. The likelihood of achieving the same results in 
other studies are possible given that the repetition of this study can be done in the same or 
similar context achieving a cross-circumstantial equivalence (Steenkamp, & 
Baumgartner, 1998). By this it is meant that researchers with a similar background as 
possessed by this researcher using the same methods with a similar dataset, including a 
similar mix of media reports, similar methods of analysis used, and in a similar time 
period (Rindfleisch, Malter, Ganesan & Moorman, 2008). However, different 
interpretations from the same dataset may provide additional insight from a qualitative 
perspective. 
Confirmability 
            The study provided an objective audit trail for future researchers to follow, thus 
allowing other researchers to replicate the study by following the methodology provided. 
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The principal caveat of this assertion is researchers that try to replicate this study should 
do so within a short time frame of several years from the date of this publication given 
that the study was a cross-sectional view of reality related to accessible media articles 
(Rindfleisch et al., 2008; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998).  Data collected from future 
studies could very likely lead to formation of the same or very similar recommendations. 
Ethical Procedures 
            Walden University’s Institutional Review Board reviewed and granted approval 
for this study. The approval number is 07-30-13-091988. There were no human 
participants in this study. 
Summary 
            The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to analyze public 
discourse surrounding Islamic terrorism in terms of frames that have been used to argue 
for enhanced government surveillance, restrictive immigration policies, and other 
erosions of U.S. citizens’ constitutional protections. Findings suggested that defenders of 
the U.S. Patriot Act in 2011 framed justification arguments as a Clash of Civilizations 
that pitted Western freedom proponents in opposition against radical Muslim fanatics in 
struggles over social change. In the following chapter the study results are described 







Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
            My purpose in this study was to analyze public discourse surrounding Islamic 
terrorism in terms of frames that are used to argue for enhanced government surveillance, 
restrictive immigration policies, and other erosions of U.S. citizens’ constitutional 
protections. More specifically, this study was to explore how policymakers frame their 
arguments to garner broad public support for a particular political agenda. The study 
fulfilled this purpose through analysis of U.S. public rhetoric about Islam and people of 
Arab heritage from politicians and high profile national news commentators post-911. 
Using frame analysis, the study interpreted this rhetoric in terms of three frames: (1) 
Clash of Civilizations, (2) loss of Endangered Constitutional Protections, and (3) 
Islamophobia. 
             In this chapter, I used content analysis to interpret narratives on the main topics 
of interest from two distinct sources: (a) anti-Islamic frames gleaned from the public 
record surrounding the original passage and later reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT 
Act of 2001, and (b) frames used in national news media when reporting on terrorist 
attacks associated in some way with Muslims or jihadism since 9/11. 
Setting, Demographics, Data Collection 
U.S.  media documents constitute the data for this study. A complete list of the 
documents used in this study can be found in Appendix A. The setting for this study as 
terrorism has become a threat to national security and safety from coast-to-coast.  This 
has been evidenced by the occurrence of lethal terrorist actions with jihadist implications 
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throughout the nation since 9/11 that have been highlighted in this qualitative study using 
discourse analysis in: Boston, MA; Chattanooga, TN; Killeen, TX; Los Angeles, CA; 
Little Rock, AK; Moore, OK; Orange NJ; Orlando, FL; San Bernardino, CA; and Seattle, 
WA (See Appendix B). This study did not include any interviews so there were no 
demographics to report. This was a study of data that was presented in media articles 
from a variety of media sources and writers from the period 2001-2016 (See Appendices 
A and B.) 
Data Analysis 
Given that politicians frame the issues before them to promote an agenda (Lakoff, 
2008), I explored common frames that were used to justify the Global War on Terror and 
to argue for or against the Patriot Act. Media articles from 44 sources characterizing the 
Post- 9/11 crisis in the United States were analyzed using the three frames of Clash of 
Civilizations, Endangered Constitutional Protections, and Islamophobia. These are 
designated as F1, F2, and F3 respectively:  
            F1: The Clash of Civilizations frame – This frame as interpreted by Huntington 
(1993) characterized the Global War on Terror as a heroic battle of great historic 
proportions and based in deep, civilizational divisions about culture , history, and religion 
among other things, in which Western defenders of freedom confronted an irrational, 
foreign threat of an Islamic nature.  
            F2: Endangered Constitutional Protections frame – This frame alerted the public 
to a corrosion of basic civil rights formerly guaranteed by the United States Constitution 




         F3: Islamophobia frame – This frame positioned Muslims as a persecuted minority 
and viewed anti-Islamic rhetoric as based in bigotry. 
F1: The Clash of Civilization Frame 
 The Clash of Civilizations frame pitted an alliance of nations representing the 
West against five or six non-Western civilizations, coalescing around radically different 
core value systems, that present a collective threat to Western hegemony (Huntington, 
1993). In this narrative, the West in the form of nation states was both hero, world savior, 
and potential victim, facing a powerful collection of enemies made up of groups of 
different civilizations acting as Islamic extremists. For example, in a 2016 address on 
terrorism, presidential candidate Donald Trump (2016) listed enemies to freedom and 
democracy that the United States defeated in the past, then followed this by the claim that 
the country was currently under repeated attack from Jihadists, in order to justify an 
aggressive foreign policy in the Middle East.  
 In the 20th Century, the United States defeated Fascism, Nazism, and 
Communism. Now, a different threat challenges the western nations: Radical Islamic 
Terrorism. In the United States, there has been one brutal attack after another. In its 
heroic role, Huntington (1993) saw Western civilization standing for science, democracy, 
progressive values, and rationality. The West faces challenges from competing 
civilizations, such as Confucian civilization centered in China, or Orthodox civilization 
centered in Russia that also were seen as heroic by supporters in times past. The non-
Western civilizations developed along different historical trajectories and in recent 
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decades have stood in opposition to core liberal democratic values. According to 
Huntington (1993), Islamic civilization would pose perhaps the greatest threat to Western 
liberal democracy in the post-Cold War international order following the fall of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. 
 Data taken from this study has suggested that there are four major themes 
associated with the clash of civilization framework: (a) anti-American vengeance, (b) 
anti-Semitic (anti-Israel) sentiment, (c) jihadism (terrorism, threat, violence), and (d) 
Western civilization vs. Islamic civilization. The mentions of these themes in 44 articles 
written and published by major media outlets are shown in Table l: 
Table 1 
 
Clash of Civilizations Framework Themes  
________________________________________________________________________
Clash of civilization               No. of articles that    No. of CCFT    
framework themes                  mentioned theme         references            
Anti-American               14        24  
   
Anti-semitism, anti-Israel                  8                   11                    
  
Jihadism, terrorism threats, violence    14        20  
  
Western civilizations vs. Islamic civilizations      9                          10    
Totals                 44                   65              
Note. Mentions to themes in parenthesis () were merged with the first listed factor to indicate who the clash 
theme was directed to. Data was collected from the texts of published media reports and articles (see 
Appendix A). CCFT = Clash of Civilizations framework themes.  
 
The table illustrates both the specific Clash of Civilizations that the media has 
captured in anti-American, anti-Semitic (anti-Israel) and jihadist rhetoric as well as the 
rhetoric describing generalizations explaining the clashes of Western civilization vs. 
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Islamic civilization. Anti-American and vengeance, and well as Jihadist, terrorism, 
threats, and violence were the most commented upon themes. 
 In the Clash of Civilizations frame, Islam has been characterized as inherently 
violent and irrational and show in examples by Kumar (2010) in her descriptions of the 
historic evolution of Islam from the time of Muhammad to time of the de facto division 
of religion and secular power, Acharya & Murdock, (2013), in their description of 
religious warfare, Nisbet, Ostman, & Shanahan (2009), in their descriptions of violence 
and irrational behavior of Islamic terrorists, and Wright (2015) in her descriptions of the 
security challenges in the past century. Further, because civilizational divides are deeply 
historical and undergird radically different core value systems, there is little chance of 
forging alliances that span these divides. The favored option of those who espouse this 
frame is to defeat the “enemies of freedom” through military force (CNN, 2001).   
 Something as grand and momentous as a Clash of Civilizations is evoked by the 
naming of the international military campaign led by the United States in the global war 
on terror. This campaign originally focused on Muslim countries associated with Islamic 
terrorism, even though, according to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
Saddam Hussein was distrustful of Al-Qaeda, and Iraq under Hussein aggressively 
outlawed Wahabism and threatened offenders with execution (Shakir, 2006).  
 Framing the war as global in nature suggests a collection of enemies, networked 
around the world, rather than a specific terrorist group or nation (Cronin, 2003). Wellman 
(2018) suggests that people live in personal communities, not terrorist groups or nations. 
The only commonality that united these enemies was the tactic of terrorism. The 
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paradigm of the terrorist organization was Al-Qaeda, but over time the war would shift its 
focus to other organizations based in Muslim countries as Al-Qaeda was no longer 
perceived to pose a significant threat (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). 
 The Clash of Civilizations frame was evoked by President George W. Bush soon 
after the 9/11 attacks, when Americans were still trying to understand what had 
happened. An example of this frame can be found in President Bush’s (CNN, 2001) 
address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, in which he framed the 
September 11th attack as a war on freedom. This speech incorporated several elements 
that activated the Clash of Civilizations frame: it pitted Western victims – Americans: 
Christians, Jews, and Muslim Americans, against Islamic terrorists in which no 
distinctions were made between military and civilians. It indicated a deep cultural divide 
in core values claiming that what the villains hated was freedom itself – the freedoms of 
religions, speech including having disagreements, voting, and assembly. The speech also 
implied that religious values may be at the heart of the conflict by closing with the 
suggestion that freedom of religion is a key point of contention along with other 
freedoms instead of a single religion that the Muslim terrorists believed in. 
 President Bush later drew criticism for referring to the War on Terrorism military 
campaign as a crusade (Waldman & Pope, 2001). The evocation of the frame of a 
religious war waged by Christians against Muslims was too transparent, and Bush 
quickly backed away from this statement in the wake of criticism from the press. 
However, the president’s original statement appeared to be a clear variant of the Clash of 
Civilizations frame. Apparently, the press reacted to the use of the word crusade, 
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referencing the Christian Crusades that was a clash between Muslim and Christians to 
secure control of holy sites considered sacred by both religions (Carroll, 2004; Waldman 
& Pope, 2001).  
 Other action-oriented politicians who supported the military efforts picked up on 
President Bush’s (2001, paragraph 62) frame that the terrorists “hate [us for] our 
freedoms.” New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani provided a case in point. In an opinion piece 
in the New York Times arguing for extending the controversial provisions of the Patriot 
Act, Giuliani (2005).  
Giuliani evoked the trope of American freedom when he said the terrorists seek not 
merely to kill Americans but to “destroy our liberties” (Giuliani, 2006, para. 2). This 
activates the frame of America as standing for freedom or liberty, against an enemy that 
opposes liberty itself – a clash of core values. 
 In an ironic twist, those who pushed for more intrusive laws and less restricted 
law enforcement policies would be accused of compromising constitutional freedoms in 
the name of defending American freedom as an abstraction. U.S. Representative Bill 
Shuster (2005) who provided an example of evoking the Clash of Civilizations frame 
when arguing for the necessity of controversial provisions in the Patriot Act in an 
editorial to the Connellsville Daily Courie. He called for the discovery, penetration, and 
infiltration of terrorist cells to be able to keep track of any planned or ongoing activity to 
preempt action as critical actions for America to pursue on the war on terror. 
 This position plays on the tropes of an irrational enemy – one who is willing to 
sacrifice his or her own life for the cause, which includes murdering innocent Americans. 
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The terrorists’ apparent irrationality is further emphasized by the statement that they have 
no clear end goal – this is an enemy whose motives are opaque and unavailable to 
innocent Americans. They may simply be evil for evil’s sake. The use of the word 
“homeland” underlines the notion of a threat from the outside, or one posed by a foreign 
enemy, even though the Patriot Act authorizes surveillance of American citizens within 
the nation’s borders.   
 Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez also evoked the frame of an evil enemy, 
biding his time overseas, when arguing to extend some controversial provisions of the 
Patriot Act. Gonzalez (2005) emphasized in an interview on a Fox News Sunday show 
that the world needed the enhanced data gathering provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act 
to protect against a diabolical threat from a patient enemy, and that those who challenge 
the act were weakening that country. Gonzalez justified the controversial provisions in 
the act by claiming these will protect America from a “diabolical, very patient enemy” 
(Gonzalez, 2005, p. 1). Thus, he associated the enemy of America with the devil, or evil 
itself.  
 In 2013, President Barack Obama backed away from some elements of the Clash 
of Civilizations frame when he announced that the United States would no longer pursue 
a “War on Terror” as a military focus. He made the point that “terrorism” is a tactic, not a 
specific enemy.  He further stated that ”We must define our effort not as a boundless 
'Global War on Terror,’ but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle 
specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America" (Obama, 2013). Obama 
later explicitly challenged the Clash of Civilizations frame when he said, “No religion is 
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responsible for terrorism — people are responsible for violence and terrorism” (Earle, 
2015). For this and similar statements distancing American foreign policy from the 
implications that the country is at war with Islam, the president drew criticism from 
conservative pundits, perhaps indicating that a segment of the U.S. population continued 
to favor the Clash of Civilizations frame (Kittel, 2015). 
 
 
 All action-oriented frames considered justification for the Patriot Act. 
The action-oriented justification for the USA PATRIOT Act included three 
framework themes: (a) the clash of civilization frame just described (see Table 2), (b) the 
organized terrorism frame, and 3) the self-radicalized hate crimes frame.  All three 




                                             No. of mentions      No. of CCFT      
Action-oriented frames           in articles               references          
organized terrorism           25   37 
    
self-radicalized hate crimes            6     8 
  
clash of civilizations           61    65   
Totals             92             110              
Note. Mentions to themes in parenthesis () were added to the first listed factor. 
CCFT = clash of civilizations framework themes.  
 
The Clash of Civilizations dominated the media coverage of these three framework theses 
by a factor of nearly 2:1 in comparison to organized terrorism as a framework and a 
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factor of greater than 8:1 over self-radicalized hate crimes.  This suggests how powerful 
the Clash of Civilizations frame could have been in the minds of those in the media; and 
with that how likely it might be that American politicians and high-profile national news 
commentators could have relied on Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations model to portray 
rhetoric to frame discussions of Islam and terrorism.  Along with this, all three action-
oriented themes taken all together closely following in the aftermath of the 9/11 killing 
spree suggest a response to RQ1 and RQ3 - how legislators could have followed the 
national broadcast media in using the Clash of Civilizations model to gain popular 
support to justify authorization and reauthorization of the Patriot Act as a public policy 
response.  A response to RQ2 and RQ3 is also suggested following fears that can 
generate from terrorism, hate crimes and the radicalized Muslims who practice it.  
 Self-radicalized hate crimes did not have any subthemes as distinguished from the 
Clash of Civilizations and organized terrorism frame coded themes. This frame could 
have had subthemes coded by demographic categories such as race, religion, ethnicity, 
cultural preferences, but I judged the quality of the data pool to not be sufficiently 
consistent or sophisticated to carry sufficient credibility. Only six out of 44 (14%) of the 
news media articles contained references to self-radicalization, and there were only 8 
references to self-radicalization found in those articles. This finding suggests that self-
radicalization, while a powerful concept in and of itself, was not a widespread perceived 
practice at the time of the study.  
 Organized terrorism contained two powerful sub-thematic codes as shown in 
Table 3. Mass murder, killing spree dominated the coverage by a factor of 1.5:1 over Isis, 
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Organized                     No. of articles that    No. of CCFT      
terrorism                                mentioned this          references            
ISIS, Al-Queda                      10                        15   
  
Mass murder killing spree               15   22   
Totals             25              37             




 Proponents of the Patriot Act: The counter terrorism measures . 
The proponents of the Patriot Act and its reauthorization have argued for four 
major policy themes to protect the nation against the possibility of further attacks such as 
the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. These 
four themes are captured in media reports and discussion including the four themes 
shown in Table 4. The theme that had the most mentions by a margin of more than 2:1 
was communication surveillance as put forth by the Patriot Act and its reauthorization. 
The next highest media mention was for the theme of harsh penalties for terrorists and 
their supporters including the seizure of weapons. These findings suggest that 
communication surveillance could be a proxy for what is believed to be the most 
effective policy of managing domestic terrorist attacks. Widespread communication 
surveillance would lead to a loss of privacy and equal protection and with that a response 







Counter-terrorism               No. of articles that   No. of CCFT      
measures                                    mentioned this       references           
Harsh penalties for terrorists and their supporters  5       11 
 
Immigration controls, warrant simplification, profiling         2        7 
 
Information sharing, vigilance, semantic clarity in press 4        4   
 
Communication surveillance as put forth by the Patriot                                            
    
Act and its reauthorization     7      25   
Totals                             18                 47                
Note: Mentions to themes in parenthesis () were added to the first listed factor.  CCFT = clash of  
civilizations framework themes. 
 
 In the broader perspective of anti-hawk frames in which counter-terrorist 
measures belong, there are two other major themes that can be discerned in media 
discussions – Endangered Constitutional Protections and Islamophobia, as can be seen in 
Table 5. The two anti-hawk themes of greatest concern and discussion of the three 
themes listed are Endangered Constitutional Protections and Counter-Terrorism 
Measures.  What was unexpected was the lower amount of discussion about 
Islamophobia relative to the two other themes suggesting that the somewhat subjective 
Islamophobia theme could be less important to more people than the two other relatively 




Conservative                         No. of articles that      No. of CCFT      
Frames                                    mentioned this            references            
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Counter-Terrorism Measures               18        47                     
 
Endangered Constitutional Protections             16        50  
  
Islamophobia               10        13   
Totals                44                 110              
Note: Mentions to themes in parenthesis () were added to the first listed factor.  CCFT =  
Clash of Civilizations framework themes. 
 
F2: The Endangered Constitutional Protections Frame 
Opponents of the Patriot Act often criticized it for violating basic constitutional 
protections. Defending the constitution is a powerful frame in American political 
discourse. This frame pitted the heroes who fight to defend traditional freedoms 
guaranteed by the nation’s founding documents against power-hungry politicians who 
seek to expand the government reach at the expense of its citizenry. In the case of the 
Patriot Act, this grab for power was justified by government paternalism, the claim that 
the government needed to expand its law enforcement activities in order to protecting the 
public from terrorism (e.g., Goldsmith, 2013). 
             The victims, according to the Endangered Constitutional Protections narrative, 
were the American people, who were at risk of losing freedoms and rights they 
previously took for granted. In criticizing the Patriot Act, all Americans stood to see their 
freedom encroached upon by such activities as secret government surveillance of their 
cellphones and electronic communications, but Muslim-Americans might be especially at 
risk through ethnic profiling by law enforcement agencies. Because this ethnic profiling 
also had a religious component, critics contended it also ran afoul of the First 
Amendment of the Constitution. In the Endangered Constitutional Protections frame, 
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critics who opposed the expansion of government power were positioned as heroes. 
             This frame was used by politicians who argued against the passing of the Patriot 
Act in the first place, and later for letting special provisions of the act expire. President 
Clinton’s chief of staff John Podesta was an example of a member of the political 
establishment who evoked a constitutional freedom frame to argue against the 
wiretapping provisions of the Patriot Act. In the year following the passage of the act, 
Podesta (2002) wrote, “The sharing of such a broad range of information raises the 
specter of intelligence agencies, once again, collecting, profiling and potentially 
harassing U.S. persons engaged in lawful, First Amendment-protected activities.” 
Podesta thus took a position in defense of a religious minority.   
            Four themes dominated discussion in the media about Endangered Constitutional 
Protections as seen in Table 6.  Personal freedoms – religion, speech, equal protection, 
and civil liberties; and unlawful search and seizure, due process, and notice were the two 
themes that led the commentary in the media, with the right to privacy, a close third. 
These findings suggest that all of the constitutional themes are thought of as important to 
preserve as a counterweight to freedoms challenged by the Patriot Act of 2001 and the 
reauthorized Patriot Act of 2011.  
Table 6 
 
Endangered Constitutional Protections 
_________________________________________  
Endangered Constitutional   No. of articles that    No. of CCFT      
Protections                              mentioned this          references           
Freedom of the press            6                            18                   
 




Right to privacy                                5                     13                 
 
Unlawful Search and seizure           3      17                       
Totals            18                 50   
Note: CCFT = Clash of Civilizations framework themes. 
 
        Another opponent of the act that raised questions of loss of Endangered 
Constitutional Protections was the Center for Constitutional Rights. In a report that was 
critical of the act, the group wrote, “perhaps of greater concern than specific abuses are 
the ways in which civil liberties have been eroded by the introduction of sweeping new 
laws, and by the codification of abusive practices through executive order and interim 
rules” (Ball, 2004, p. 79).  
 An early vocal opponent of the Patriot Act was Senator Russ Feingold, the only 
member of the Senate to vote against its passage. In a speech presented on the floor of the 
Senate before bill passage, Feingold (2001) repeatedly evoked the frame of protecting the 
Endangered Constitutional Protections: 
We must continue to respect our Constitution and protect our civil liberties in the 
wake of the attacks…Preserving our freedom is one of the main reasons that we 
are now engaged in this new war on terrorism. We will lose that war without 
firing a shot if we sacrifice the liberties of the American people…We must 
maintain our vigilance to preserve our laws and our basic rights…Congress will 
fulfill its duty only when it protects both the American people and the freedoms at 
the foundation of American society. So let us preserve our heritage of basic rights. 
Let us practice as well as preach that liberty. And let us fight to maintain that 
freedom that we call America. 
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F3: The Islamophobia Frame 
 Islamophobia as an anti-hawk theme contained three partially subjective sub-
themes – bigotry, Muslim association and self-radicalization - as can be seen in Table 7.  
The self-radicalization theme garnered a third more media discussion and attention as 
bigotry, and twice as much as Muslim association. This finding suggests a response to Q2 
- that self-radicalization and bigotry were more powerful sources or triggers of 
Islamophobia than Muslim association, but might be conflated with these themes as they 
could be interpreted as being associated with the study themes, even though they are 
independent.  There were five themes in this category that I have called anomalous 








                                              No. of articles that     No. of CCFT      
Islamophobia                       mentioned this            references          
Bigotry (racial, religious, sexist)       3       4                
 
Muslim (Islam) association               2                  3                  
 
Self-Radicalization hate crimes         5                  6                   
Totals             10                                          
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Mentions to themes in parenthesis () were added to the first listed factor. There were themes that did 











                                              No. of articles that   No. of CCFT      
Islamophobia                       mentioned this            references            
Common criminal                            1      1    
               
Drugs & alcohol abuse                       2                 6  
                 
Mental illness                        10               13 
                  
Personal grievances              6                 9 
                  
Undetermined motive                         1                 1                       
     Totals             20               30               
Note: CCFT = Clash of Civilizations framework themes. 
 
  Mental illness stood out among the themes as attracting a third more media 
attention than personal grievances and twice as much as drugs and alcohol. Mental 
illness is a more complex theme than the others included in this table as can be seen in 
Table 9. Inexplicable (senseless) mental illness was cited as the most appropriate label for 
violence that was witnessed or described by a factor of more than 4:1 over the random 
killing of strangers and more than 300% more over bipolar mental illness. These findings 
suggest that those who write about the mentally ill in these situations, know little about 




                                                  No. of articles that     No. of CCFT      
Mental Illness                           mentioned this             references           




Inexplicable, senseless, random killing of strangers           8                       10                      
Totals               10                   13           
Note: Mentions to themes in parenthesis () were added to the first listed factor. CCFT = Clash of 
Civilizations framework themes. 
 
In order to further explore the implications of anti-Islamic frames and the loss of 
political freedoms in this study, I selected national and local news reports covering the 10 
high profile cases of lethal terrorist attacks since 9/11. These are cases in which the 
Muslim identity of the killer was highlighted and questions of jihadist terrorism were 
raised. This phase of the study addressed the problem of scare-mongering in U.S. 
political discourse around the threat of Islamic terrorism.  In this multiple case study, I 
used frame analysis to explore: (a) how the U.S. news media covers sudden tragic events, 
and (b) how mass shootings by suspected jihadists have been reported in the national 
news media.  Since 9/11 there have been 10 violent incidents within U.S. national 
borders, claiming 95 lives, that have been investigated for connections to jihadism. The 
majority of these attacks met the FBI’s definition of terrorism based on statements from 
the killers or evidence that emerged on investigation (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
2016). Each case included reporting from the first day of the attack (see Appendix B). 
Early reporting on unexpected events provides an example of news media struggling to 
contextualize events within existing frames, and the initial reports represent a period 
when uncertainty of how to interpret the events is highest. These reports therefore 
provide examples of fitting current events within a standard narrative. The list below 
provides a number for each case for the purpose of reference in this study and gives the 
sources used in the framing analysis. 
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(a)  El Al Ticket Counter Shootings, 2002 (Associated Press, 2002; CNN, 2003; Fox 
News, 2002; Holguin, 2002) 
(b) Seattle Jewish Federation Shootings, 2006 (Associated Press, 2006; Sullivan, 
2010; Yardley& Rudoren, 2006) 
(c) Fort Hood Shootings, 2009 (Browne, & Herridge, 2013; Friedman, Esposito, 
Nelson, & Kannampilly, 2009; Kenber, 2013) 
(d) Little Rock Military Recruitment Office Shootings, 2009 (Abrams, 2009; CNN, 
2009; Serrano, 2011) 
(e) Boston Marathon Bombing, 2015 (Associated Press, 2015, 2016; Nakashima, 
2013) 
(f) Vaughan Food Processing Plant, 2014 Beheading (Ellis, Sutton, & Levs, 2014; 
Silver, 2014; Williams & Schmidt, 2014) 
(g) Washington and New Jersey Spree Killings, 2014 (Crimesider Staff, 2014; 
Queally, 2014; Stack, 2015) 
(h) Chattanooga Military Facilities Shootings, 2015 (Associated Press, 2015; 
Fernandez, Blinder, Schmitt, & Pérez-Peña, 2015; Zamost, Khorram, Prokupecz, 
& Perez, 2015) 
(i) San Bernadino Office Party Shootings, 2015 (Botelho & Ellis, 2015; Medina, 




(j)  Pulse Nightclub Shootings, 2016 (Alvarez, & Pérez-Peña, 2016; Burke, Otis, & 
Slattery, 2016; CBS, 2016; Ellis, Fantz, Karimi, & McLaughlin, 2016; Grenell, 
2016; Levine, 2016) 
The analysis focused on the dominant frames presented in the reporting of the incidents. 
Frame analysis was used to compare reporting the incidents along several lines of 
questions:    
      (a) How was the incident characterized?                 
      (b) How were the perpetrators and victims characterized? 
      (c) Was the tone of article written in a style to dramatize and alarm, or to calm and 
            reassure? 
             The association of the attacks with jihadist extremism through culturally salient 
frames was sometimes used to introduce Islamophobic tropes, highlighting the Muslim 
identities and religious motivations of the killers. This frame served to bolster anti-
Islamic sentiment, to portray Muslims as a foreign threat, and to garner support for the 
idea of a Global War on Terror. Islamophobic frames of high-profile incidents are often 
evoked to explain why such attacks occur and what should be done to prevent them, but 
alternative frames suggesting opposing interpretations and implied responses also occur. 
            Reporters, editors, or owners of news outlets need not consciously choose 
alternate frames that emphasize or deemphasize purported religious motivations or the 
ethnic identities of the perpetrators. Rather, framing choices represent the prevalent 
cultural narratives that journalism, as a cultural practice, reproduces and naturalizes 
(Skinner, Gasher, & Compton, 2001). Following an analysis by Kumar (2010, 2012), I  
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explored the contributions of news reporting to three claims relating to post-9/11 
Islamophobia: (a) that framing terrorist attacks in terms of a Clash of Civilizations incited 
anti-Muslim prejudice in the American public, (b) that this Clash of Civilizations frame 
was propagated nationally by broadcast and print news, and (c) that new legislation 
crafted in the climate of the resulting anti-Islamic panic Endangered Constitutional 
Protections provided by the Constitution of the United States.  
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Implicit to postmodernist theory and framing in communications is that framing 
may or may not reflect objective reality. An operating assumption of this study was that 
many implications of the Clash of Civilizations frame were not realistic in their 
characterization of the Islamic threat. The rhetoric was often epiphenomenal in the sense 
of pressing emotional buttons with little concern over accurate reporting. In the 
discussion section below, evidence was cited to support this claim. 
 The news reporting frame analysis phase of this research explored the editorial 
decisions of a sample of national news sources. These included Fox News, CNN, ABC 
News, USA Today, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, 
The Los Angeles Times, and The Guardian. The use of these prominent news outlets is 
not presented here as representative of mainstream cultural trends or somehow 
generalizable to “the American public.” Frames drawn from these sources are to be 
considered exploratory findings that will lend themselves to critique and analysis and 
open up new lines of inquiry. Such exploratory ends are appropriate to the qualitative 
methodology used, which makes no claims of objectivity or broad generalizability. 
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            Rather than drawing broad conclusions from this data, the semantic and framing 
analysis of news reporting represents an attempt at contextualizing academic arguments 
on such topics as a Clash of Civilizations, the spread of anti-Islamic propaganda in the 
United States news media as a pretext for justifying use of military force overseas, and 
the discrimination and divisiveness that can be tied to anti-Islamic rhetoric. 
Credibility 
            The purpose of the frame analysis was to investigate examples of Islamophobia in 
the U.S. media post-9/11. The credibility criteria in qualitative research privileges the 
perspective of the users of frames over that of any external evaluator. From this 
perspective, culturally competent consumers of the news sources of interest are the ones 
who can legitimately judge the credibility of this research (Trochim, 2006a). Should 
consumers of national news reporting read the completed study, they may then weigh in 
on its credibility by indicating the extent to which they find the results reported here 
believable. 
Transferability 
            A different researcher selecting a different sample of news sources may find some 
frames that were not considered in this study. Such limitations on transferability are 
inherent in qualitative research involving a non-exhaustive sample of news sources. 
Should another qualitative researcher wish to obtain similar results to those reported here, 
it is up to that researcher to follow the research protocol of this study and then to decide 
which contextual variants are most relevant for obtaining similar or different results. 
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Newer research on a similar topic will establish the limits of transferability of these 
findings. 
Dependability 
            Where quantitative research aims at abstracting out the differences among any 
number of unique situations, qualitative research focuses on ever-changing contexts 
(Trochim, 2006a). If this study is conducted again in a few years, it will be interesting to 
learn if the changing political climate and distance from 9/11 and the Islamophobia it 
spawned will generate different perspective and themes from groups of randomly 
selected students in America. 
Confirmability 
            Confirmability in qualitative research refers to the degree to which the results 
could be confirmed or corroborated by others (Trochim, 2006a). Another researcher who 
wished to show that Islamophobic public discourse in post-9/11 America was 
insignificant or not transparent to students could survey a different set of news sources 
that specifically target in on politically liberal or conservative frames (see Appendix C). 
Disconfirming results arrived at by examining different news sources would invite 
scrutiny and critique. Readers of a disconfirming study on this topic could compare the 
data collection procedures and the analysis of the two studies to reach a conclusion about 
which study best captures the truth, and which distorts it. 
Results 
           Responses to the most recent and most significant attack in terms of fatalities, the 
Pulse Nightclub Shootings, explicitly highlight how the framing of such incidents in the 
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news media and by politicians has become an explicitly a contested political issue. 
Presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton characterized the attack as 
a hate crime against sexual minorities, speaking out against the killer’s “horrible sense of 
vengeance and vindictiveness… against LGBT Americans” (Grenell, 2016, para. 2). 
Clinton used the terms “madman” and “hate,” suggesting two common frames used to 
report mass killings: the mental illness frame and the hate crime frame. Clinton’s framing 
of the attack in this manner was denounced by a Fox News commentator as disqualifying 
her for the presidency as “too weak” (Grenell, 2016).   
            On the other end of the political spectrum, the presumptive Republican 
presidential nominee Donald Trump commented on the incident as a clear case of 
“radical Islamic terrorism” and used this incident to justify a proposed ban on Muslims 
entering the country (Levine, 2016). Donald Trump then went on to criticize President 
Obama for failing to frame such incidents in these exact terms. A commentator from the 
Huffington Post characterized Trump’s response as horrific (Levine, 2016). 
            Obama directly responded to Trump, arguing that simply using the phrase “radical 
Islamic terror” would not help anything. What exactly would using this label accomplish? 
What exactly would it change? Would it make ISIL less committed to try to kill 
Americans? Would it bring in more allies? Is there a military strategy that is served by 
this? The answer is none of the above. Calling a threat by a different name does not make 
it go away (Levine, 2016). 
In surveying the news reporting on the 10 deadly attacks, I found three frames to 
be most commonly used in the initial reports: (a) the  undetermined motive frame, (b) the 
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organized terrorism frame, and (c) the mental illness frame. Other less common frames 
that were used to interpret the killings were: (d) the hate crime frame, (e) the personal 
grievances frame, and (f) the common criminal frame. I will discuss how each of these 
frames were used in the reporting on these incidents in more detail below. 
Undetermined Motive Frame 
            Even when the circumstances of an attack implied jihadist motive – the targeting 
of Israeli airline passengers by an Egyptian national (a) or statements made by the killer 
himself (as seen in framing sources: a, c, d, f, j, see Data Collection and Analysis section 
above, pp. 84-85), nearly all the initial reports include statements from F.B.I. officials or 
other investigators that the motive is “unclear,” the act was “random,” and that no links 
were found connecting the killer to terrorist groups. Even when the perpetrator explicitly 
claimed connections to ISIS or other Islamist radical organizations, officials questioned 
these claims pending further investigation. 
Organized Terrorism Frame 
            Although this frame is often raised as a possibility in the days following the 
reporting of an attack, the frame will not be officially confirmed by the F.B.I. or the 
White House until after the completion of an investigation lasting a year or longer. 
Evidence required for the official confirmation include a history of electronic 
communication with known terrorist cells (c, h, i, see Data Collection and Analysis 
section above, pp. 84-85), or extensive travel abroad to places where the perpetrator had 
an opportunity to become radicalized (d, i, see Data Collection and Analysis section 
above, pp. 84-85). While officials are slow to evoke this frame, the perpetrators 
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themselves often frame their crime in these terms by explicitly claiming ties with jihadist 
terrorism or claiming anti-American rationales for the attack (c, d, f, h, j, see Data 
Collection and Analysis section above, pp. 84-85). In some cases, these claims of ties to 
jihadist terrorism are later questioned or found unsupported upon investigation (f, g, j, see 
Data Collection and Analysis section above, pp. 84-85). 
Mental Illness Frame 
            This frame is often evoked by noting that the perpetrator was a loner or misfit 
who had recently experienced failure in marriage, business, and life in general (a, d, e, f, 
h, i,j, see Data Collection and Analysis section above, pp. 84-85). A history of mental 
illness, such depression, bipolar disorder, or brain damage is also mentioned, along with 
failure to take medications (b, d, h, see Data Collection and Analysis section above, pp. 
84-85). Former friends, relatives, lovers or close associates with the perpetrators often 
express surprise at the violent acting out. They found the attack inexplicable and 
characterize the killer as “a tender person,” “close to his family” (a, see Data Collection 
and Analysis section above, pp. 84-85), “a popular student in high school” who was 
highly malleable and influenced by his older brother (5), “not a violent person” and “a 
good kid” f, see Data Collection and Analysis section above, pp. 84-85), and “a very 
sweet guy [who] never showed a violent side, loved to be cuddled… [and] was looking 
for love" (j, see Data Collection and Analysis section above, pp. 84-85). 
Hate Crime Frame  
            Alternately categorized as a “bias motivated crime,” a hate crime is a violent 
criminal act that targets a victim based on his or her actual or perceived membership in a 
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social group (FBI, 2016). In contrast, terrorism entails the use of violence in order to 
“intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population… in furtherance of political or 
social objectives” (FBI, 2005). Reporting on several incidents framed them as hate crimes 
more than terrorism: against Jews (a, b), white people (f), or the LGBT community (j), 
although there can be some overlap between the two categories. 
Personal Grievances Frame   
            In two of the incidents, the perpetrator targeted former coworkers at a workplace 
where the perpetrator had been fired and complained of being harassed (f, i). In a third 
incident, the perpetrator targeted members of an ethnic and sexual subculture – gay 
Latinos – from which the killer felt excluded and rejected (j). These Personal Grievance 
Frames were considered in some reports to better account for the attacks more than the 
jihadist frames the killers adopted. 
Common Criminal Frame  
            Although the perpetrator of the Washington and New Jersey Spree Killings (7) 
converted to Islam, changed his name to a Muslim name, shouted “Allahu Akbar” as he 
killed, and claimed to be making “just kills” to punish the U.S. government for its 
military action overseas, the murders were done and no ties were found to organized 
terrorism. The crimes included the targeting of gay men, luring them to private locations 
using a dating app, and then killing a young college student in the course of a car-jacking. 
The murders were reported as common street crimes in the reports surveyed here. 
Discrepant Findings 
            I found that many of the frames used in the reporting of mass killings surveyed 
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above were complex and mutually contradictory. Not all the frames could be readily 
classified as promoting Islamophobia. Law enforcement official statements by agents 
tended to be especially cautious when they were asked to categorize an incident as 
jihadist terrorism, even when the initial reports seemed to indicate that as a real 
possibility. Some of the data (c, d, f, g, j, see Data Collection and Analysis section above, 
pp. 84-85), indicate that the perpetrators themselves made deliberate efforts to frame the 
attacks as jihadist in intent, while later investigations found no ties of these attacks to 
larger terrorist organizations, and instead found evidence of psychological deterioration, 
random criminal behavior, and personal vengeance as the primary explanations.  Such 
cases are discrepant with the hypothesis that the news media are consistently motivated to 
promote Islamophobia and the idea that the United States faces a foreign threat on its 
own soil. 
            The notion that Islamophobia is a widespread or dominant media framing of mass 
killings perpetrated by Muslims or persons of Middle-Eastern heritage was not born out 
by the data collected in this study, Although the organized terrorism frame was common, 
it was not the dominant frame across all incidents, and was often balanced by competing 
frames, as was seen in Chapter 4, Table 5. 
                                                                Summary 
 Data from this study came from two types of sources: (1) public pronouncements 
from prominent politicians, lawmakers, and high profile news reporters concerning the 
nature of America’s global war on terror and on the constitutionality of the Patriot Act, 
and (2) news media reports of deadly attacks within United Sates national borders in 
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which the perpetrator was identified as Muslim. The concept of frames was used to 
analyze the deep structure of the narratives people used when discussing current political 
issues or promoting their favored agendas. 
             The content analysis of the first phase of this study generated additional 
questions about the characterizations of Islam and Muslims in the Western media. These 
emergent questions contributed to a critique of the media representations. This critique 
was rooted in framing theory, which claims that the manner in which issues are presented 
evokes cognitive schemas or culturally salient models that provide a context for 
interpretation along with an implied course of action or reasonable response that follows 
from the frame (Lakoff, 2008).  Some emergent questions that came out of the content 
analysis included the following:  When Muslims are broadly characterized as terrorists or 
radical Islamists, how does this influence new legislation and public support for such 
legislation? If Muslims are so characterized, then what should be done about this? 
             Following the Endangered Constitutional Protections frame, a different set of 
questions emerged: How can a democratic society based upon equality for all create 
legislation that is culturally discriminatory without in effect compromising its national 
identity? From the perspective of the Islamophobia frame, how can the United States or 
any other nation productively conduct foreign policy or global diplomacy while 
harboring prejudice toward a large ethno-religious category? In order to explore these 
questions among non-pundits and common folk, I arranged to conduct a second phase of 
the study. 
            The first dataset found politicians selecting a Clash of Civilizations frame in order 
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to justify U.S. military campaigns in the Middle East and to argue for increased 
government surveillance of U.S. citizens. It also found that politicians who challenged 
government intrusion into private communications would adopt a competing Endangered 
Constitutional Protections frame to make their case. 
            The second dataset consisted of a survey of early reports by national press outlets 
covering mass killings. In these published reports, I found that using the organized 
terrorism frame, with reference to jihadism and radicalization, was a common frame, but 
that alternative frames were also used. News media reporting of such attacks is 
ambivalent where it concerns how to frame them. The organized terrorism frame may be 
used to justify the claim that Americans must sacrifice certain freedoms and accept 
greater government surveillance during a time of national crisis, as when facing an 
increased threat of terrorism from militant jihadists. Alternative frames, such as the 
mental illness frame or the common criminal frame are used instead to argue for tighter 
gun control laws (Siddiqui, 2016). In the next section, I will further analyze these 
findings and their implications.  
 
 




Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
My purpose in this study was to analyze public discourse surrounding Islamic 
terrorism in terms of frames that have been used to argue for enhanced government 
surveillance, restrictive immigration policies, and other erosions of U.S. citizens’ 
constitutional protections. The overarching purpose of this study was to explore how 
media framed their arguments to garner broad public support for a particular political 
agenda. 
            The frame analysis of political discourses focused on three dominant frames, or 
language choices that might lead an audience, in this case policy makers,  to adopt a 
particular stance on an issue. The three frames were: 
•     Clash of Civilizations frame – A frame that posited a national existential threat to the 
United States from an irrational foreign enemy in the form of Islamic terrorist 
organizations (Huntington, 1993). 
•     Endangered Constitutional Protections frame – A frame the pitted politicians who 
positioned themselves as defenders of constitutional freedoms against others who would 
sacrifice these freedoms in the name of protecting the public from a foreign threat 
(Concerned Citizens Against the Patriot Act, 2015).  
•     Islamophobia frame – A frame that portrayed Muslims as a persecuted minoritygroup 
and exposes anti-Islamic rhetoric as a form of bigotry (Kumar, 2010). 
                                                            Key Findings 
            For the analysis of politicians’ arguments surrounding the Patriot Act and its 
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reauthorization, it appears that key findings of this study were as follows: 
•  Politicians arguing in support of the act used Clash of Civilizations frames that 
emphasized fear and promulgated misleading characterizations of an Islam associated 
with violence and irrationality. 
•  Politicians arguing against the act used Endangered Constitutional Protections frames 
that suggested the new laws sacrificed civil liberties. 
The media explaining the mass killings used the Islamophobia frame to suggest that 
Muslims were a persecuted minority. 
                                              Interpretation of the Findings 
            In this section, I explored the ways that the findings confirm, disconfirm, or 
extend ideas in the academic literature reviewed in Chapter 2. The main points of 
reference were Huntington’s (1995) Clash of Civilizations thesis, Kumar’s (2012) 
critique of Islamophobic discourses in the American news media, Fox and Miller’s 
(1995) analysis of a “postmodern” media environment characterized by 
“epiphenomenalism,” and Lakoff’s (2008) frame analysis. 
Islamophobic Discourse 
I focused discussion groups that explored the resurgence of Orientalism in early 
21st century American public discourse. The research therefore explored topics that came 
out of the academic tradition founded by Said. Said’s (1978) Orientalism was an 
influential founding document in post-colonial cultural studies. Said’s critique of the 
patronizing attitudes of Westerners toward non-Westerns or “Orientals” centered largely 
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on fictional depictions of Islam and the Muslim “other” of the Middle East and North 
Africa.  
 Kumar (2010) extended Said’s thesis to 21st century U.S. political discourse by 
noting an ideological shift toward Orientalism from the Bush senior and Clinton 
Administrations, where anti-Islamic rhetoric was not prominent in foreign policy 
discussions, to the George W. Bush Administration where the “Global War on Terror” 
was framed as a multination Clash of Civilizations campaign of the liberal West against 
fundamentalist Islam. Kumar characterized the Orientalist frames of American politicians 
and prominent spokespersons in the national media as hegemonic and therefore sought to 
counter these ideologies in her work. 
            Response to RQ1: How do U.S.  politicians and high-profile news 
            commentators in the national broadcast media use of Clash of Civilizations  
            rhetoric to frame discussions of Islam and terrorism. 
            In interpreting the data, I considered five Orientalist stereotypes that I took from 
Kumar’s (2010) analysis. These stereotypes portrayed Islam vis-à-vis the West as a 
civilization quite different from the West that was  (a) monolithic, (b) uniquely sexist, (c) 
irrational and unscientific, (d) inherently violent, and (e) undemocratic—clearly a clash 
with Western civilization, that was oppositional in every one of these key factors.  The 
monolithic stereotype comes into play when the 1.5 billion Muslims in the world, 
approximately 22% of the world’s making up around 50 Muslim majority countries, 
including distinct schools of jurisprudence, such as Sunnis, Shi'as, and Kharijites, are 
reported in the U.S. press as a single, undifferentiated hostile group (Kumar, 2010).  The 
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alternative would be to recognize that subgroups of Muslims in various parts of the world 
are more likely to be victims rather than perpetrators of terrorism associated with a small 
sect of radical militants (Kumar, 2010).  The sexist stereotype justly raises issues of 
subordination of women in some Islamic societies, or unjustly framed norms of cultural 
modesty as a violation of women, while ignoring near parallels in Western society or 
Judeo-Christian religion (Kumar, 2010). Likewise, the characterization of Islamic nations 
as violent, undemocratic, or technologically backward is meant to serve as a contrast to 
the technological democracies of the West, only by glossing over historical contributions 
to technology and law from the Islamic world (Kumar, 2010).     
Response to RQ2: How does the use of such frames constitute a kind of 
Islamophobia  
            I found that depictions of Islam and Muslims in the U.S. news and entertainment 
media were often unfair and inaccurate as exemplified and discussed in the results section 
of Chapter 4. In elaborating possible objections to these images, I argued from the fallacy 
of composition: the error of assuming that what may be true for members of a group is 
true for the whole group. The fallacy of composition includes essentializing – an 
accounting of group differences in terms of stereotypes and overly broad generalizations 
(Wagner, Ruadsepp, Holz, & Sen, 2016). This leads to simplistic notions of Islam as a 
monolithic tradition, in which all Muslims speak with one voice, failing to recognize the 
plurality of identities and beliefs within Islam (Hughs, 2013). Contrary to rhetoric that 
essentialized Islam and associates it with a foreign threat, Islam is not monolithic, and 
those who use the fallacy of composition include essentializing – an accounting of group 
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differences in terms of stereotypes and overly broad generalizations (Wagner et al., 
2016). This leads to simplistic notions of Islam as a monolithic tradition, in which all 
Muslims speak with one voice, failing to recognize the plurality of identities and beliefs 
within Islam (Hughs, 2013). 
            Response to RQ3: How do these frames influence public opinion, spreading  
           fear and suspicion of Muslims? More specifically, how are such frames  
           used to garner popular support for extreme, invasive measures by the  
           security state? 
            When these frames were used immediately following 9/11 they did indeed show 
how public opinion was influenced, spreading fear and suspicion of Muslims, and 
justifying the garnering of public support for extreme, invasive measures by the security 
state, thus addressing RQ3. 
            Response to RQ4: How do new security measures that were instituted in the 
Islamophobic political climates represent a loss of traditional freedoms, such as 
rights to privacy and equal protection under the law for all citizens? 
 In a rush to judgment, the use of these frames also showed how new security 
measures that were instituted in the Islamophobic political climates represent a loss of 
traditional freedoms, such as rights to privacy and equal protection under the law for all 
citizens, regardless of ethnic or religious identity, thus addressing RQ4, as shown in 
Chapter 4, tables 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
            Countering the mass fear and overreach for political power that characterized 
legislation in the years following 9/11, many political commentators seemed willing to 
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portray Islam in a positive light, as a religion of peace, and adopted the Islamophobia 
frame to reject those who thought the religion was associated with radical terrorism, in 
sympathy with the idea that Muslims were unjustly maligned. The term Islamophobia 
itself entered public discourse and did not necessarily seem loaded or biased, as people 
began generally to understand its implications. This runs counter to critics of the term, 
who have found it divisive and inflammatory. For example, in the aftermath of the 
January 2015 Charlie Hebdo shooting, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls, while 
acknowledging the problem of prejudice against Muslims, stated, “I refuse to use this 
term ' Islamophobia,' because those who use this word are trying to invalidate any 
criticism at all of Islamist ideology. The charge of ' Islamophobia ' is used to silence 
people” (Goldberg, 2015, p. 1). 
            Since December 2012 terms like homophobia and Islamophobia have been 
dropped from the Associated Press Stylebook, a standardized English language usage 
guide for professional American journalists. The reason given for discouraging such 
language in news reporting was that calling something a phobia implies an understanding 
of the mental state of another individual that is not warranted, and also carries the 
implication of ascribing a mental disability to one so labeled (Blumenfeld, 2012). Critics 
of the term find it polarizing, and express concern that it constitutes a form of name-
calling and may be used to shut down debate over the actual extent to which Islamism is 
implicated in terrorism. 
             Another objection to the term is that it ascribes a psychological disorder or 
irrational fear or hatred to those who fear religious-based militancy.  In addition to older 
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associations of a phobia with a diagnosable mental illness, the Islamophobic frame may 
forge an unconscious association with the more salient term homophobia. Recent polling 
of Millennials (the age cohort born between 1981 and 1997) have found this group to be 
especially concerned over social issues and the victimization of minorities (Tierney, 
2014). This age demographic also tends to be the most tolerant of gay marriage. The term 
homophobia is salient to this group and an accepted descriptor of social injustice 
targeting gays. It is a small step to empathize with the plight of persecuted Muslims and 
see their persecutors as Islamophobes and bigots. 
Postmodern Media Climate  
      Another concern that was raised  in this research was the disconnection from reality 
in Islamophobic rhetoric. Opinion polls of Muslim Americans taken in the months 
following 9/11 showed that they perceived media depictions of Islam and Muslims as 
distorted and unfair (Nacos, & Torres-Reyna, 2004). Commenting on common 
stereotypes of Middle-Easterners in an earlier decade, Said (2007) wrote, “Muslims and 
Arabs are essentially covered, discussed, apprehended as either suppliers of oil or as 
potential terrorists. Very little of the detail, the human density, the passion of the Arab-
Muslim life has entered the awareness of even those people whose profession it is to 
report the Islamic world” (p. 189). 
            Fox and Miller (1995) described a “postmodern” media climate, characterized by 
a disregard for facts, a blurring of news and entertainment, and unstable fleeting barrage 
of signs and images that disorients people’s capacity for critical thought and leaves them 
unable to discern what is real. They characterized this postmodern media climate as 
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“epiphenomenal,” meaning that the information broadcast over mass media creates its 
own insular narratives, which may be entirely disconnected from facts. 
            One would expect Fox and Miller’s (1995) postmodern media consumer to be 
unable to distinguish reality from propaganda, to be overwhelmed by ever shifting signs 
and narratives that perpetually distract them, and to be linguistically incapable of forming 
cogent, critical arguments even if they felt something was wrong. Did the news reporting 
of subsequent attacks reflect a mindless backlash against Muslims and Islam that might 
be characteristic of this postmodern media environment? The reticence of the security 
state to quickly ascribe mass shooting or bombing incidents to “Islamic terrorism” 
suggested otherwise. 
            When reading Fox and Miller’s account of the postmodern news consumer, one 
would not expect the media consumer to be reflective of the effects of the barrage of 
distracting narratives, nor would one expect the postmodern media consumer to be so 
quick to distance themselves from dominant media narratives. 
Framing 
            According to Lakoff (2004), a cognitive linguist, frames are constructs that 
structure the way people understand what happens in the world, affecting our actions, 
objectives, intended procedures, and results. Political frames structure our the way we 
organize our social strategies and the organizations we create to implement these 
strategies. Thus, reorganizing frames changes social outcomes. 
             Lakoff (2004, 2008) developed the theory of conceptual frames and related this 
to American political discourse during the decade following 9/11/2001 – the period 
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relevant to this study. According to Lakoff, frames are created through language to 
influence other speakers of that language to draw desired conclusions; the choice of 
words used to tell a story or relate a news item will influence audiences’ opinions on 
what is being reported. Frames have the power to change the way the public sees the 
world, or what counts as commonsense. Frames also have real consequences for how 
people will act; if an incident is framed as a foreign attack from a hostile other, as 
documented in this study, people are prone to react in fear and take aggressive measures. 
            Frames are essential to coherent thought. We can shift from one frame to another 
by selecting different words to describe a phenomenon, but we cannot opt out of having 
any frame whatsoever (Goffman, 1974). Also, facts are subsidiary to frames for arriving 
at accepted views of the world. People think primarily in frames, not facts. For a fact to 
be accepted, it must fit the frame. When the facts do not fit the frame, the frame stays, 
and the facts go (Entman, 1993). Subjects also selectively seek out facts that support their 
favored frames (van der Pas, 2014). Without any frames to hang them on, facts make no 
sense in and of themselves (Lakoff, 2008, p. 16). The tables in Chapter 4 indicate the 
frequency of themes used in the American press in the early 21st century to frame acts of 
violence as organized terrorist attacks by Islamists. These break down into finer 
categories, such as the recent manifestations of a centuries-old clash between 
fundamentally different value systems (Table 1), or an alien psychology of evil people 
who inexplicably hate us for what we most prize about our national character (Tables 5, 
8, and 9). There are also tensions within the U.S. national discourse suggesting that the 
state may have overreached its powers of surveillance in protecting the citizens (Table 6), 
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or that the tarring of Muslims represents an unjustified fear or othering (Table 7).  The 
action-oriented frames in Table 2 and the conservative frames Table 5 call for enhanced 
policing, greater restrictions on travel, and fewer protections of privacy. These illustrate 
the capacity of frames using coding and NVivo software to clarify patterns existing in the 
44 news media articles that were analyzed in this study. The predominance of action-
oriented Clash of Civilizations framing seen in Table 2 and relative lack of predominance 
of Islamophobia conservative counter-terrorism measures seen in Table 5 was 
demonstrably clear in these tables and played a key role in addressing the four research 
questions in this study.  The action oriented frames in Table 2 show that the Clash of 
Civilization frame unexpectedly dominated media coverage for all four measures by a 
factor of more than 2:1 over the Organized Terrorism frame that followed, and the Self-
Radicalized hate crimes was hardly mentioned as a frame. In Table 5, there was another 
unexpected finding in that the Islamophobia frame was the least covered frame by the 
media as compared with Counter-Terrorism Measures and Endangered Constitutional 
Protections, which dominated the coverage. All other tables showed close relationships 
between the item with the exception of the Anomalous frames shown in Table 8 in which 
the dominance of Mental Illness was shown as the most common type of motive for 
Islamophobia by almost 2:1 over personal grievances and nearly negligible for the other 
options – common criminal, drugs and alcohol abuse and undetermined motive. 
            Common frames that have been used to discredit Muslims are the “potential 
terrorist” frame discussed by Said (2007) and the sexist, violent, irrational, and 
undemocratic frames elaborated by Kumar (2010). Kumar deployed Islamophobia as an 
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alternate frame that characterizes Muslim haters as bigots and possible suffering from 
irrational delusions. The Islamophobia frame may also work for American Millennials 
who are prepared to defend Muslim Americans as a persecuted minority. 
                                              Accuracy of Political Framing 
            As noted above, frames constitute a basis for political messaging that need not 
comport with reality (Fox & Miller, 1995). There is in fact reason to believe that in 
framing their arguments in support of a Global War on Terrorism, members of Congress 
were not wholly accurate in their portrayals and engaged in propagandizing. For example, 
according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, between 1980 and 2005, Muslim 
extremists accounted for only 6% of terror acts committed on U.S. soil. Latino, left wing, 
Jewish, and other groups including right wing and neo-Nazi extremists all accounted for a 
larger number of acts of terror in the U.S. during this period.  
            That there was national defense as well as civil rights implications intrinsic to 
reauthorization of the Patriot Act seems clear, particularly from the perspective of 
Muslim-Americans. In a poll released by the Pew Research Center for People and the 
Press in summer 2011, 55% of Muslim-Americans reported that it had become more 
difficult being a Muslim since 9/11, 28% reported that people had acted suspiciously 
toward them, and 21% reported that they believed they had been singled out by airport 
security. Overall, 52% of Muslim-Americans reported they believed that government 
anti-terrorism policies singled out Muslims in the U.S. for increased surveillance and 
monitoring. In an updated poll by the Pew Research Center for People and the Press in 
the summer 2017, 75% reported there was a lot of discrimination against Muslims in the 
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U. S., 62% did not see Islam as part of mainstream society, 50% reported that in recent 
years being a Muslim in the U. S. has gotten more difficult. So, although opinions did not 
appear to have changed very much, they have improved over the six year period between 
the summer of 2011 and the summer of 2017. 
            Reauthorization of the three Patriot Act provisions was approved by Congress and 
signed into law by President Obama on May 26, 2011. In the House of Representatives, 
the vote largely divided along party lines. The House voted 250-153 to renew the law’s 
controversial provisions. Thirty-one House Republicans joined most Democrats in 
opposing the extension, while 54 Democrats supported it. In the Senate, reauthorization 
passed 72-23, with most of those in opposition being Democrats (Fox News.com, 2011, 
May 27). Representative King and Senators McConnell and Kyle, who depicted the need 
to renew these provisions as a matter of fighting Islamic terrorism, voted to renew the 
provisions. Republican Senator Paul joined Democrat Senators Wyden, Durbin and 
Democrat Representative Ellison who depicted renewal as a threat to civil liberties, voted 
against. Clearly affiliation alone did not define how members of the Congress framed the 
debate over Patriot Act reauthorization. 
                                            The Mass Media and Terrorism 
            While traditional broadcast media was centralized in terms of a few powerful 
media corporations and largely unidirectional in its dissemination of information, the 
mass media throughout the West and certainly in the US has been steadily shifting from 
centralized corporate controlled broadcast media to the Internet (or the Web).  The 
Internet represents not just an alternative delivery platform but a new media form in 
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itself. In this respect, the Web has certainly contributed to the perception of Muslims in 
general as being terrorists not through its structure but in how it has been manipulated by 
both the traditional mass media as well as actual terrorist organizations. A recent research 
study by Silkworks, Schmuck Matthes, & Binder (2017), has confirmed how this is 
possible by demonstrating that news coverage connecting Islam to terrorism  by the 
Islamic State can initiate fears in non-Muslims.  By contrast, differentiation of news 
coverage between Muslims and Muslim terrorists can tamp down fears.  The ease with 
which this can be done shows how perceptions can be easily manipulated. Participants in 
this study read biased articles produced for this study to measure framing effects about 
fear of Muslims.  This phenomenon has been born out in numerous ways. In a Gallup 
Poll, Americans have identified terrorism as the most significant problem facing the U.S. 
(Riffkin, 2015). The rise of the self-proclaimed Islamic State or the Islamic-Caliphate on 
June 28, 2014, has elevated media coverage worldwide (Satti, 2015; Zhang & 
Hellmueller, 2016). Previous research has uncovered that Muslim prejudice in the West is 
regularly framed negatively in numerous studies (Ahmed & Matthes, 2016; Bowe, 
Fahmy, & Wanta, 2013). 
            The Internet has substantially enhanced the recruiting, funding and propaganda 
capacities of virtually all terrorist groups throughout the world (Dornbierer, 2011). This 
has occurred at such a pace that it has been noted that by the new millennium all of the 
terrorist organizations that the State Department in the U.S. had migrated their recruiting, 
funding and propaganda operations to the Web in one form or another. This has been 
somewhat overlooked by the general population that is constantly subjected to the threat 
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of terrorist attacks across the Web and Internet by the mass media. The mass media carry 
a constant refrain of the threats that important institutions in the U.S. – such as financial 
markets, government networks and military databases – face due to cyber terrorism 
(Broadwater, 2011). Seemingly under the radar for the average news watcher is while 
these threats do exist, the usurpation of the Web and its functionality by terrorist 
organizations seems to be a more prevalent and worrying threat. 
            In this regard, while the actual number of terrorists and terrorist organizations that 
align themselves with Islam is small, the Internet gives these individuals and 
organizations an outsized voice (Zhang & Hellmueller, 2016). The Web acts to amplify 
these organizations’ beliefs and doctrine so much so that what they espouse is often 
reported in the mass media as applying to all Muslims or Islamic countries in general. 
The result is that the average individual in the West may have difficulty in discerning 
between legitimate Muslim and Islamic websites and those that espouse a doctrine of hate 
and terror. 
            Terrorist organizations typically utilize the Internet to enhance their ability to 
communicate with their members, develop recruitment networks, engage in some level of 
psychological types of warfare and to generate revenue channels to fund terrorist 
activities (Whittaker, 2004). For example, on August 19, 2014, the Salafi jihadist 
extremist militant group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) broadcast a video on YouTube titled “A 
Message to America.” (Lister, 2015). The video began with President Obama’s 
announcement of U.S. airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq, then showed James Foley, an 
114 
 
American freelance video reporter covering the Syrian war, reading a confession of 
regret, followed by Foley’s beheading at the hands of a black-clad ISIS fighter (Carter, 
2014). Although YouTube deleted the video, a copy of it continued to be hosted on the 
shock site BestGore.com, and was tracked and made available for personal download 
through the Bittorrent site Pirate Bay (Halliday, 2014). ISIS, unlike earlier terrorist 
organizations that used electronic media mainly for internal communications, has been 
noted for its use of open platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, and for the enhanced 
production values it put into English language videos targeting American audiences 
(Siegel, 2014). 
            The overall structure of the Web facilitates these activities because of its 
decentralized character. This type of highly decentralized infrastructure is one that suits 
terrorism and terrorist organizational structure very well. Terrorist groups typically 
operate in cells that act independently of each other and that maintain a veil of secrecy in 
terms of who manages them and what they are tasked with accomplishing (Cragin & 
Daly, 2004). Likewise, the Web consists of literally millions upon millions of 
independent websites, and by some early accounts there are more than several million 
unique networks throughout the world across which billions of users regularly navigate 
daily (Cragin & Daly, 2004). Since this structure of the Web suited the purposes of the 
typical terrorist organization these entities acted quickly to migrate over to Web-
enhanced operations. 
            Especially alarming for many in the West has been the capacity for the Web to be 
subverted for uses related to psychological warfare and various related applications. In 
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fact, many of those individuals that are actually targets of this type of Web-based 
terrorism are Muslims themselves, who reside both in Islamic countries and abroad. 
Those terrorist organizations that are actually inspired by their Islamic ideals often target 
their own populations in order to obtain broader support, although this support remains 
extremely small (Mauro, 2013). Many of these terrorist entities design legitimate 
webpages that publish their objectives to the general public and which tend to avoid any 
of the atrocities for which they are known but they also put up on the Web various web 
pages that host images and videos of their more brutal acts of violence as a means to 
intimidate and instill fear in others (Cragin & Daly, 2004). For instance, video images of 
numerous beheadings can be found throughout the Web. These types of acts are 
attributed to a relatively insignificant portion of the Islamic population but which gain an 
unprecedented platform by being published across the Web. 
            These types of images and videos result in an extremely effective environment of 
mistrust and fear between various groups, cultures and countries. These images and 
videos are designed to elicit fear and to affect change in the behavior of those who view 
them. In this regard, the Web has been a boon for terror groups that seek to instill this 
fear in other groups as well as to control their own populations from which they originate. 
Therefore, terrorist groups that are broadly associated with Islam such as al-Qaeda and 
ISIS have been very successful at cultivating their image and influence within the general 
public and within the Western media. Cultivating such influence within the Western 
media allows these terrorist organizations to influence U.S. foreign policy, affect voting 
patterns by influencing which candidates are most relevant and affect how U.S. business 
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interests are conducted internationally (Gamson, 1992). 
            This power and influence that is amplified by the Internet has been extremely 
effective for terrorist organizations in general and not just for those Islamic oriented 
terrorist groups. Thus, this has worked to enhance the influence that these groups actually 
have as well as to contribute to the negative association of Muslims and Islam with being 
terrorists and terrorist supporting entities. Reviewing these materials in a comparative and 
small group analysis provided an understanding of the social impact of the material. 
                                                  Limitations of the Study     
            The data for this study was limited to publicly available statements by politicians, 
news reporters, and news commentators at the national level. The time frame of the study 
covers a 15-year period from 2001 to 2016. The statements surveyed represent a variety 
of opinions across the political spectrum. The frames discovered represent the 
institutional interests and political agendas of a range of different institutions, including 
the press, elected officials, and heads of government agencies. This represents the 
multivocal nature of contemporary political discourses in the United States. Some of the 
frames explored represent Islamophobic discourses and attempts to increase the reach of 
the surveillance state, while others push back against these trends by using alternative 
frames. 
            Since the subject matter of the research was public statements concerning 
politically charged issues, the claims of representativeness of national public opinion only 
extends to the material surveyed. A replication of this research might expand the number 
of frames by looking at different cases or present a different picture of anti-Muslim 
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prejudice and the nature of U.S. foreign policy by sampling a different set of 
representatives. The accuracy of quotations used in this research is only as good as the 
reporting of statements available through news outlets. 
                                                        Recommendations 
            In light of the above limitations, future research might include a direct 
comparison of media reporting of non-jihadist terrorist attacks since 9/11 to contrast the 
frames used when reporting on plots with no connection to Muslims or Islam. Adding a 
comparative perspective to this phase of the study might provide evidence for unequal 
treatment of similar threats from homegrown terrorists when they are perceived as being 
tied to Islam. 
            Future research could also be helpful in investigating frames, themes, speculative 
claims, media reports, assertions, and premature conclusions about the classification of 
criminal, terrorist, and potential radical actions, behavior, motivation, and communication 
that are complex and currently difficult to discern patterns about.  Opportunities to do so 
could be possible to embark on this kind of research using social media and emergent 
technologies in big data analytics in such nascent fields as “computational criminology” 
and established fields such as operations research (Watson, 2014; Williams, Burnap, & 
Sloan, 2016). Opportunities are currently being studied, for example, in analyzing online 
social media together with offline data, log files, video, image, Radio Frequency ID 
(RFID), and GPS, merging data that has not been previously statistically related and 
connected. Research over time could also clarify the previously opaque activities and 
patterns of Al Queda, ISIS, Taliban and other terrorist networks and their ties to Islam 
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and other groups, providing greater clarity, enabling the elimination of erroneous 
speculation and spurious generalizations. 
                                                             Implications 
            This dissertation explored expressions of Islamophobia in American political 
discourse and the damaging effects of such fear-mongering. To this end, the study 
included an analysis of anti-Islamic frames as expressed by the political elite, and a meta-
analysis of such frames by laypersons outside the political elite. 
            Although the mass media may be implicated in a reflexive social construction - in 
which official voices broadcast their policies, and an independent press provides 
feedback on how these policies affect the citizenry - those elites who have privileged 
access to the microphones wield great power, and when the public does not press back, 
the conversation becomes one-sided. A potential positive impact of research into how 
discourses are framed is to raise awareness of the epiphenomenal world of false and 
manipulative frames so that common citizens can see them for what they are. This 
research also provides a basis for formulating and promoting alternative, counter frames. 
            Distortions and fear-mongering over the Muslim threat in post-9/11 America 
raises questions of religious intolerance that go right to the heart of America’s claims to 
be a liberal democracy. To single out one group of Americans for special scrutiny based 
only on their religious affiliation runs up against the First Amendment, which was 
established by the nation’s founders to protect religious minorities from government 
persecution. 
             Separation of American society into a dominant, mainstream religious group and 
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a vilified religious minority has tarnished America’s image internationally as a 
democratic nation built on freedom of religion and equality for all. In this way 
Islamophobia not only harms its Muslim targets but also comes back to hurt 
Islamophobes and American society as a whole. 
            The American public’s fears over Islamic terrorism are not of mere academic 
interest. Policy makers have exploited these fears by framing their political 
pronouncements so as to activate them. Research into framing shows that citizens form 
opinions based on narratives that activate familiar storylines that resonate with their 
preformed cognitive models of how the world works. Research that raises awareness of 
this form of social construction provides appropriate tools to counter it. 
                                                             Conclusions 
            Policymaking in the United States is a political process that is influenced by the 
frames that politicians use to advance their agendas. The news and entertainment media 
play an integral role in broadcasting these frames and swaying public opinion. The mass 
media thus serves as a public platform for those political and corporate interest groups 
that have a stake in influencing policies. By choosing the right frames, government 
spokespersons and newspaper columnists control the nature and scope of national debates 
and the flow of information to the public. 
            Since the 9/11 attacks, the trope of Islamic inspired terrorism has been a central 
concern in guiding U.S. foreign policy. Action-oriented politicians seized upon fear in 
order to advance their agendas. By approaching this topic from several angles, this 
dissertation has argued that Islamophobia is a by-product of deliberate political framing. 
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            The impact of Islamophopobia on Islamophobes is similar to the impact of racism 
on racists. Islamophobia could ultimately hinder Islamophobes’ ability to work 
effectively in pluralistic settings and could lead to “lower self-esteem and higher levels of 
anxiety” (McKown, 2005, 177). As for society as a whole, Islamophobia could erode 
national unity, signal a departure from the nation’s core value of E pluribus unum - out of 
many, one - have the potential, as a form of prejudice, to antagonize people and to 
therefore inadvertently promote the very terrorism it claims to revile (Khera, 2011, 343), 
and thus confound the management of orderly social change such as acculturation of 
middle eastern immigrants into American society. 
            By raising awareness of media manipulation and framing effects, discourse 
analysis provides the tools to counter false and destructive frames and to invent more 
productive alternatives. This dissertation has attempted a small contribution in the 
direction of exposing malicious rhetoric that compromises American freedoms without 
increasing security. Future research along this line will further engender understanding 
and mutual respect among peoples of the world and challenge those “civilizational” lines 
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